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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
PHERREL DRAPER and NELL FAIRBANKS
DRAPER, his wife, J. B. DUNN and JULIET
CRISMAN DUNN, his wife, JACK C. DUNN
and GLADYS WILEY DUNN, his wife, GLEN
DRAPER and LORN A F. DRAPER, his wife,
R. L. REINSIMAR and MARGARET DRAPER REINSIMAR, his wife, ERNEST J.
PEDLER and VIRGINIA A. PEDLER, his
wife, HENRY L. BUTLER and VIVIENNE
DRAPER BUTLER, his wife, and CHARLES
P. RUDD and GLADYS M. RUDD, his wife,

Case No.
7685

Plaintiffs and Appellees

-vs.J. B. and R. E. WALKER, INC., a corporation,
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The entrance to Big Cottonwood Canyon in the Wasatch Mountains is approximately eighteen miles south of
the city limits of Salt Lake City. As a result of prehistoric geological processes and the action of ancient
Lake Bonneville, there was deposited at the entrance
of the Canyon, an enormous amount of sand, gravel and
other sedimentary soils. This deposit has been cut trans1
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versly by Big Cottonwood Creek, and thereby a defile
through the deposit was formed. This action concerns
that part of the deposit which is situate north of the
defile, and will be hereinafter referred to as "Walker
Deposit" (Ex. 1, R. 90; R. 821).
Big Cottonwood Creek as it debouchs from the canyon gorge in the immediate vicinity of the Walker Deposit runs in a northerly and westerly direction (Ex. 1,
R. 90).
The defendant is now and was at all times hereinafter mentioned a corporation organized and existing
under and by virtue of the laws of the State of Utah (R.
62, 821). One, Mary Goff Walker, is the fee simple owner
of the Walker deposit and adjacent land (Ex. NNN, R.
951). Under an arrangement with Mary Goff Walker,
which is only indirectly involved in this action (R. 951),
the defendant was in possession of said deposit and land
in the year 1946 and sine~ that time has been continuously in possession of the same (R. 822). The Walker
deposit is an immensely valuable source of sand and
gravel for the manufacture of concrete and for the production of aggregate for use in the construction of roads
and highways (R. 830, 831, 952). The material is considered the best and most effective produced in the
western section of the United States (R. 950). The sand,
gravel and road aggregate yielded by the Walker deposit
enters into the economy of Salt Lake City and surrounding areas as necessary material in the construction industry (R. 952). It is of a highly desirable quality, and
since the installation of its processing plant hereinafter

2
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particularly described, defendant has been one of the
major producers of sand and gravel products of the
Salt Lake City area (R. 952).
The defendant is not the only operator and producer of sand and gravel products from the major deposits at the mouth of Big Cottonwood Canyon. There
were on the date of the commencement of this action and
for a considerable period of time prior thereto, nine other
operations in this area (Ex. 25, R. 941 ; Ex. B, R. 323,
324). The following is a tabulation of these neighboring
operations.
Name of
Operation

Established

Huber and Davis
Elmo England
Salt Lake County
Cook and Osborne
Sims

1930
1950
1946-47
1946
1920

R 947

Harper

1920

R 948
R 948
R 947

Utah Sand & Gravel Co.
Barton
Abandoned

1950
1949

R
R
R
R
R

943
944
945
945-6
946

Distance from
Walker
Operations
2,000 ft.-air line
2,500 ft.-air line
3,000 ft.-air line
3,000 ft.-air line
3,500 to 4,000 ft.

-air line
4,000 to 5,000 ft.
-air line
6,000 ft.-air line .
Butlerville Hill
4,000 ft.-air line

In the month of June, 1946, defendant commenced
the ·construction· of its sand and gravel processing plant
upon the Walker deposit and on the adjacent land (R. 97,
822). At time of trial it represented an investment of
$308,659.00 (R. 954). The plant is modern in every respect and was designed by a competent engineer (R. 895,

3
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

1263-1265). Installed therein are efficient mechanical
devices which were new at the time they were acquired
by the defendant (R. 1265). The method of handling and
processing the raw material after it has been excavated
from the mountainside involves the use of an extensive
conveyor system which reduces dust (R. 1268). The type,
construction and lay-out of the plant are well shown on
Exhibit A., R. 96; Exhibit B, R. 98; and Exhibits 26, 27
and 28, R. 960. The machinery composing the plant are
feeders (Exhibit 15, R. 870), jaw crushers (Exhibit 16,
R. 871), vibrating screens (Exhibit 17, R. 872), roller
crushers (Exhibit 18, R. 874) and the conveyors.
Wasatch Boulevard is a public highway extending
along the base of the Wasatch Mountains in a general
north and south direction. At the point where the defendant's plant is located the sand and gravel deposit
is situate east of Wasatch Boulevard (Exhibit 1, R. 90).
Wasatch Boulevard, in the immediate proximity of the
defendant's plant, had been covered with an oil mat, but
due to its deterioration was scarified in the year 1946
(R. 925): Work commenced to rebuild the boulevard in
February, 1949 (R. 926). By August 1, 1950, the boulevard had been reconstructed and had been finished with
a black top to a point immediately east of the Walker
plant. There is evidence that prior to the black topping
of this road that it produced a great amount of dust (R.
927).
The production of sand, gravel and road aggregate
after the raw material has been excavated from the
Walker deposit, requires the transportation of the mate4
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

rial to the rollers and crushers. Thereafter when the
material is reduced to the required sizes through the
process of crushing, segregation is effected by passing
the material through screens of different meshes (Ex.
17, R. 872). Reference to Exhibits A, B, 26, 27, and 28,
supra, will indicate to the reader exactly the location and
function of the machinery and appliances above mentioned. At the time involved in this action the raw material was immediately removed from the Walker deposit
by means of a drag line and was placed on a conveyor
belt which carried it to an elevated point east of Wasatch
Boulevard and at the edge of the vehicular surface thereof (R. 828, 852). At that point it was dropped perpendicularly through a cylinder or "elephant trunk" to a
"grizzly" or screen located on the east side of the hard
surfaced area of the boulevard (R. 828, 829}. It passed
through a "grizzly" and dropped onto a moving belt which
is located in a tunnel constructed transversly under Wasatch Boulevard. This tunnel containing the conveyor
belt was constructed by permission of the Board of
County Commissioners of Salt Lake County (R. 822).
Material dropping on to this subterranean belt was carried through the tunnel under Wasatch Boulevard into
the jaw crusher (R. 829), where it was crushed and
ground to reduced sizes (R. 877). Thereafter by passage
through a series of roller crushers and screens, the material is sorted and automatically finds it way on to conveyor belts. These conveyor belts operate within steel
5
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channels or tracks and serve to convey the rnaterial to
the exterior limits of the conveyors where it is dropped
to the stock piles above mentioned (Ex. 1, R. 849, 850).
It will be noticed by reference to the exhibits above
mentioned, that the Walker deposit itself, Wasatch Boulevard and the jaw crusher are located at an elevation fixed
by various witnesses at approximately 75 feet (R. 849),
above the level of the pit floor (R. 850).
There are two types of crushers in use at this plant.
The first is the jaw crusher which stands on the west
side of Wasatch Boulevard and is a prominent object in
the aforesaid exhibits (R. 871). The second type is known
as the roller crusher (R. 874). This roller crusher weighs
about 15,000 pounds (R. 888) and is composed of two
rollers ( R. 881). One of them is of smooth surface and
its twin is heavily corrugated. The corrugations are
pyramidal in shape (R. 879). Material is run between
the corrugated and smooth surface roller which rapidly
revolve each in opposite direction and the material is
thereby crushed (R. 881). The corrugations on the rough
surface roller become flattened or worn from the friction
of material against it in the process of crushing (R. 881).
It is therefore necessary to "build up" these corrugations
and this is effected by welding metallic substances thereto (R. 881-883). During this welding process the plant
must necessarily cease operations and as a consequence
welding has been done principally at night (R. 887). It
is an electric process whereby the added metallic substance is reduced to a molten state by a current of electricity passing through it which melts it and affixes it

6
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to the roller (R. 882-884). This welding process necessarily produces flashes of light when the electrified
metallic substance n1akes contact with the roller to which
it is to be welded (R. 886). The flash is but momentary
(R. 886). In adding the molten material to the roller
there are formed "beads" on the roller (R. 890). The
"slag" on the face of these "beads" must be knocked off
before other molten. material is added (R. 890). The
"slag" is an oxidization of certain of the material included in the molten welding rod which form, like "dross"
on a lead pot when lead is being melted. Before contact
can be established with the newly welded material this
"dross" or "slag" must be knocked off with a small hammer (Exhibit 14, R. 891). The noise produced by this
pounding is limited (R. 892), and merely involves the
knocking off of the "slag" (R. 892). The smooth roller
as a result of the friction created by its action on the
raw material becomes worn and uneven and must also
be built up by a similar process (R. 882).

.•
/

The defendant in its welding operations used two
types of welders.. One is a gasoline welder which is
powered through a gas engine. It is a portable machine
which can be used about the plant (R. 888). The second
type of welder is an electric welder which is merely a set
of rectifiers to change the power from AC to DC, with a
fan to circulate air through it. The noise produced by
this welder is similar to that of an electric fan (R. 887).
The finished product consisting of sand, gravel and
road base material is stocked in separate piles, conical
in shape, as shown on the exhibits to which reference is
7
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above made. It is from these stock piles that the completed product is taken for transportation and sale. The
transportation is by means of motor trucks which are
driven to the immediate vicinity of the stock piles and
there loaded. The road base rna terial is loaded by means
of a drag line (Ex. 22, R. 906). On Exhibit 1 (R. 905)
is shown an underground tunnel approximately 460 feet
long marked "S-T". The stock piles of concrete aggregate
are accumulated on top of this tunnel. Within the tunnel
is a conveyor belt and the concrete aggregate is introduced from the stock piles into the tunnel and onto the
conveyor belt where it is transported to the northeasterly
end of the tunnel. At that point the material drops onto
a loading belt which conveys it into the trucks (R. 904,
905, 906).
In October 1948, excavation for the Deer Creek Aqueduct of the Metropolitan Water District commenced in the
area of defendant's plant (R. 919, 921). The nature of
this excavation is graphically shown in the following
photographs: Exhibit 2 (R. 911), Exhibit 3 (R. 911),
Exhibit 4 (R. 912), Exhibit 5 (R. 914), Exhibit 6 (R. 914)
and Exhibit 7 (R. 918). The conduit excavation or trench
in which the concrete aqueduct was placed varied from
fifteen to thirty feet in depth (R. 919). The bottom of the
trench was approximately twelve by fourteen feet in
width and the top was about fifty feet wide (R. 920).
The material removed from the trench was piled along
its sides and this spilled material attained a considerable height and breadth (R. 920). The excavation of the
part of the trench extending from Wasatch Boulevard
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southwesterly through defendant's pit floor and up to the
Butlerville Hill commenced on June 27th, 1949. Prior to
that tin1e, the work was conducted northeast of Wasatch
Boulevard and southeast of Butlerville Hill road. From
June 27, 1949 until the latter part of November, 1949, the
work of excavating the trench and constructing the aqueduct continued through the land in possession of defendant (R. 921). Heavy machinery and equipment were used
in effecting this excavation (R. 921, 922), and as a consequence a tremendous amount of dust was created.
There was a cloud of dust over the area during the entire
time that the equipment was in operation (R. 922). In
excavating this aqueduct trench, it was necessary to build
two "shoofly" roads. One of them extended from the
top of Butlerville Hill down its slope to permit construction equipment to reach the aqueduct right of way (R.
923; Exhibit 24; R. 924 ; R. 925), and the other was a bypass on the county road on Butlerville Hill. During the
time of this construction, the natural vegetation along the
line of the aqueduct trench and the temporary roads was
destroyed and the removal of such vegetation allowed
sudden gusts of wind to pick up dust from the devastated
areas and carry it into the air (R. 923, Exhibit 24; R.
929).
Big Cottonwood Highway, a public road which has
existed for a number of years, runs adjacent to the pit
floor. It had been previously an improved highway, but
in 1946, it had so deteriorated that the top had been scarified and in fact became a gravel highway. It remained
in that condition until approximately September 1st,
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1947. During the construction of Deer Creek Aqueduct,
it was again torn up where it passed adjacent to defendant's pit floor. From June 27th, 1949, to the time that
the work on the aqueduct on Butlerville Hill was completed, this road was in a dilapidated condition and remained so until November of 1949 (R. 932). It produced
a great amount of dust (R. 934).
The plaintiffs were at the time of the commencement of this action, and for several years prior thereto,
the owners of residences situate adjacent to the land of
which defendant was in possession. The location of these
homesites with reference to defendant's operations is
shown upon Exhibit NNN (R. 566), which is a plat of
this area reproduced from the Salt Lake County deed
records. The plaintiffs acquired these properties at the
approximate times shown on the following schedule:
Date of
Acquisition
of Property

Name of Plaintiff
Pherrel Draper and Nell Fairbanks Draper (R. 91)

1936 or 1937

J. B. Dunn and Juliet Crisman Dunn, (R. 412)

1933

Jack C. Dunn and Gladys Wiley Dunn
Glen Draper and Lorna F. Draper,

Dec., 1947

R. L. Reinsimar and Margaret Draper Reinsimar,
(R. 327 and R. 431)

May, 1937

Ernest J. Pedler and Virinia A. Pedler
(R. 448, R. 562)

July, 1944

Henry L. Butler and Vivienne Draper Butler
(R. 5'67)

1937

Charels P. Rudd and Gladys M. Rudd

(R~

567)

1924
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The plaintiffs Butler, sold and conveyed their residential property in August, 1950, (R. 523), which was
after the date of the commencement of this action, to-wit:
October 18, 1949, (R. 6).
The aerial photographs introduced in evidence, Exhibit A (R. 96), Exhibit B (R. 98), Exhibits ZZZ and
Exhibits YYY (R. 1569), will reveal an area south and
west of defendant's plant which is tree planted. This is
the area within which the plaintiffs' residences are situate. These aerial photographs may be sychronized with
Exhibit 1 (R. 90 and R. 665-673), which is a map upon
which is delineated and marked these respective homes.
The plaintiff Draper owns three houses marked respectively, PD1, PD2 and PD3, on Exhibit 1 (R. 95 and 96).
The houses of the other plaintiffs are appropriately
marked on Exhibit 1 so that same may be identified.
This action was commenced and prosecuted by the
plaintiffs against the defendant for the purpose of securing an injunction restraining defendant "from maintaining or using said gravel pit or processing plant" on the
ground that the operation of the same constituted a nuisance by reason of the fact that defendant in the removal
of the sand and gravel and the processing of the same
as hereinbefore described "causes considerable dust to
rise and settle upon the lands and homes of plaintiffs,
and by the movement of such rocks and dirt and the stockpiling of the resulting sand and gravel, the roads, lanes,
and creek located upon the lands of plaintiffs, and in
the vicinity thereof, have become obstructed" (R. 2).
Furth~r the plaintiffs alleged "that the operation of
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said gravel pit and processing plant as aforesaid, in the
manner operated by the defendant, is injurious to the
health of plaintiffs, and offensive to their senses and
an obstruction to the free use of and access to their property, so as to interfere with their comfortable enjoyment
of life, and their property, contrary to the laws and
statutes of the State of Utah~ * ~ ."
The plaintiffs particularize and describe of the
alleged nuisance by alleging:
(a) That dust is deposited on the natural vegetation on plaintiffs' land, which is detrimental thereto, and
the natural beauty of said homes and lands is thereby
destroyed.
(b) That dust from the plant infiltrates into the
homes of the plaintiffs and is deposited upon the furniture and household effects and food.
(c) The operation of defendant's plant results
in loud noises which disturb plaintiffs in their sleep and
normal affairs of life.
(d) That the operation of the welding machines
produces light and noise prohibiting rest and sleep (R.
4).

Of particular concern in this action are certain allegations contained in the complaint with respect to the alleged obstruction of roads and lanes. The following pertinent excerpts are therefore set out:
"That in the operation of said gravel plant
aforesaid, defendant causes huge rocks and boulders to be rolled down the -mountainside, and
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moves great quantities of dirt • • • and by the
movement of such rocks and dirt, and the stockpiling of the resulting sand and gravel, the roads,
lanes, and creek located upon the lands of plaintiffs, and in the vicinity thereof, have become obstructed."
(Par. 6 Complaint, R. 2).
"That in the operation of said gravel plant
aforesaid, defendant has caused rocks, boulders,
and dirt to be rolled down the mountainside and
has changed the terrain from its original state,
and has dug away the roads and placed huge
stockpiles of sand and gravel, so that defendant
has blocked and made parts of plaintiffs' property
inaccessible, by obstructing right-of-ways, paths,
and other means of ingress and egress to the property of plaintiffs, thereby damaging the same,
and rendering said properties of no value as
homes, or for any purpose."
(Par. 7, Complaint, R. 3).
"That the operation of said gravel pit and
processing plant, as aforesaid, in the manner operated by defendant is * * *, an obstruction to the
free use of and access to their property."
(Par. 8, Complaint, R. 3).
During the trial the plaintiffs were permitted to
serve and file an amendment to their complaint (R. 35),
which alleged:
.
"c. Without limiting the generality of the
nuisance here complained of, as defined by 10456~1 U.C.A. 1943, plaintiffs alleged:
"That the various operations, as described,
and the piling and the piles of sand and gravel
constitute an attraction and attractive nuisance,
and the loading and caving in are a serious danger
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to children who are attracted thereto, which interferes with the safe and comfortable enjoyment
of plaintiffs' properties, and lessens the personal
enjoyment thereof by plaintiffs, or others, residing therein.
"That the conditions caused, and as in this
paragraph 8 referred to, are offensive to the
senses and injurious to the health of the occupants
of the properties of plaintiffs, as herein involved
and described."
Defendant answers the complaint and the foregoing
amendment by denial (R. 20, 21, 49) and pleaded the defense of acquiesence by the plaintiffs in the construction
and erection of defendant's sand and gravel plant and
alleged that plaintiffs by their conduct were estopped
from asserting and claiming the operation of said plant
is a nuisance (R. 50). Plaintiffs, by their reply denied
the affirmative defense of defendant (R. 51).
At the conclusion of the trial, the court made, entered and filed its findings of fact and conclusions of
law. For the convenience of the Appellate Court, the
appellant inserts herein the pertinent and material parts
of the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and the
Judgment.
"FINDINGS OF FACT
1. That plaintiffs are all residents of Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, and that defendant is a corporation organized under the laws of the State of Utah,
and duly qualified to do business in said State.
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2. That defendant, a Utah corporation, owns, and,
in the course of its business, engages in the operation
of what is commonly known and described as a gravel
pit and sand and gravel processing plant. That said
gravel pit and business, conducted thereat, is located at
the mouth of Big Cottonwood Canyon in Salt Lake
County, Utah, in the vicinity of the common section corner to Sections 23, 24, 25 and 26, Township 2 South,
Range 1 East.
3. That defendant, by use of heavy machinery and
equipment, removes rocks, sand, dirt, and gravel from
the mountainside North and West of premises owned
and occupied by plaintiffs, and processes the same
through the use of crushers, graders, conveyor belts,
screens, and other heavy machinery, into sand, gravel,
and similar products for commerical use. That said sand
and gravel is conveyed, crushed, sorted, and stocked into
huge piles on the premises, until sold or removed by defendant, in the due course of its business.
4. That, in its removal, processing, and storage of
sand and gravel, there is emitted into the atmosphere
large quantities of dust, dirt, and sediment which are
carried intermittently by the prevailing natural air currents from the plant and premises occupied by the defendant corporation, aforesaid, and deposited upon the
land, homes, and effects of plaintiffs.
5. That, in the processing of sand and gravel, as
aforesaid, large crushers, screens, motors, shovels, welding machines, trucks, conveyor belts, cate.rpillars, and
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other heavy and noisome equipment is used, both in the
daytime and night-time, and that said equipment, so used,
results in loud and disturbing sounds, noises, and vibrations.
6. That plaintiffs have owned and occupied homes
located in the mouth of Big Cottonwood Canyon for many
years, and that said homes were built and occupied in an
area remote from commercial or other industrial enterprises, except as shown by the exhibits and evidence, on
account of the clear air and attractive scenic view, and
for the purpose of quiet enjoyment. That the sites for
said homes were chosen for the natural beauty, shade,
and foliage existing thereat. That said homes, owned
and occupied by plaintiffs, were established many years
prior to the acts complained of, and prior to the construction of defendant's sand and gravel operation, but
are presently in close proximity to the gravel pit and
processing plant, on the South and East thereof. That the
operation of said gravel pit and· processing plant, as
aforesaid, by defendant is injurious to the health of
plaintiffs, and offensive to their. senses, and an obstruction to the free use of their property, so as to interfere
with their comfortable enjoyment of life and their property, contrary to the laws and to the statutes of the State
of Utah, in the following particulars:
a. That dust and sand is deposited upon the shrubs,
flowers, and foliage located on the lands of plaintiffs,
and is detrimental thereto, and the natural beauty of
said homes and lands of plaintiffs is thereby destroyed.
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b. That dust and sand is carried from the plant,
storage piles, and premises occupied by defendant into
the homes of plaintiffs, and deposited on furniture, fixtures, household effects, and clothing, and is deposited
upon the food kept and consumed therein, and is deliterious thereto, and pollutes the air in said homes.
c. That the operation of the heavy equipment by
defendant, as aforesaid, results in noise so loud as to
render it impossible, while such machinery is so operated,
to hear ordinary conversation, or sleep, or otherwise
conduct the normal affairs of plaintiffs. That said noise
is of such volume that it is impossible to summon or
properly control the small children of plaintiffs, while
outside their respective houses, and substantially interferes with the play and recreation of such children; and,
further, that noise so produced by defendant is of such
volume that cries or pleas of distress of such children are
inaudible to their parents, or persons charged with their
custody and control. That such noise, so produced by
defendant as aforesaid, destroys and renders very difficult any outdoor activity or recreation by plaintiffs and
their children, or visitors, in or on their premises while
said plant is in operation.
d. As a necessary and continuing part of .said operation, .welding machines are operated at nights and
on Sundays, from which there. issues an annoying light
and pounding noise, which makes normal rest or sleep
difficult in the homes of plaintiffs, during the pit operations 01:" ~ai~ ~eldiJ1g operations.
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7. That the property owned and occupied by plaintiffs herein and subjected to said nuisance, as aforesaid,
is located substantially within the limits of the following
described real property:
Beginning at a point where the East line of
Section 26, Township 2 South, Range 1 East, intersects Big Cottonwood Creek, which is approximately 475 feet South from the Northeast corner
of said Section; thence Northwesterly along the
center of said Creek 340 feet, more or less, to the
West line of the Pherrel Draper property; thence
South go 21' West 350 Feet, more or less, to Big
Cottonwood Road; thence Southeasterly along
said road 375 feet, more or less, to the East line
of said Section 26; thense North along said Section line 180 feet more or less; thence South 71 o
40' East 250 feet, more or less, to East Line of
Jack C. Dunn property; thence North 17° East
204 feet, more or less, to center of Big Cottonwood Creek; thence Northwesterly along the center line of said Creek 400 feet, more or less, to
beginning.
ALSO : Commencing South 27° 39' East
246.18 feet from the Northwest corner of Section
25, Township 2 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake
Meridian; thence South 49° 25' East 242.13 feet;
. thence. South 29° 41' West 219 feet to center of Big
Cottonwood Creek; thence along Creek Northwesterly about 273 feet, more or less; thence
North 39° 13' East 268 feet, to beginning.
ALSO: Commencing at a point which is
South 57° 39' East 228 feet and South 50° 47' East
200 feet and South 67° 54' East 200 feet from the
Northwest corner of Section 25, Township 2 South,
Range 1 East, Salt Lake Meridian, and running
thence South 48° 10' West 290 feet; thence South
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61° 47' East along center of Big Cottonwood
Creek 170¥2 feet; thence North 34° 7' East 250
feet; thence North 47° 57' West 100 feet, to beginning.
8. That the maintenance and operation of said
.gravel pit and processing plant is a nuisance, and, if
continued, will result in substantial and permanent dam·age to the lands, homes, personal property, and health
of plaintiffs, and result further in a substantial depreciation of their said properties, and prevents the use and
enjoyment thereof, and destroys the rental and market
value thereof.
9.· a. That plaintiffs Charles P. Rudd and Gladys
M. Rudd, his wife:.,- and their predecessors in interest,
are the owners of the following described real property
located in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, and more
particularly described as follows:
Conimencing at a point which is South 57o
39' East 228 feet-and· S.outh.50? 47' East 200 feet
and South 67° 54; East 200 feet from the Northwest corner. of Section 25, Township 2 South,
Range 1 East, Salt Lake ~feridian, and running
thence South 48° 10' \Vest 290 feet; thence South
61 o 47' East along-center of Big Cottonwood Creek
170% feet; thence North 34° 7' East 250 feet;
thence North 47° 57' West100 feet, to beginning.
Contain.ing 0.8 acre. ·
- b. That said Rudd, plaintiffs, and their predecessors in interest have built and maintained a
su1nmer .. home ··arid recreational .facilities upon
. said pre1nises, ·and used-. the same since .the year
1924. That the only n1eans of .access: to said prem.ises above·. :described was over a road_ or:.right-of-
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way which extended along the Creek bottoms and
roughly parallel to Cottonwood Creek from Cottonwood Highway across the parking lot of the
Old Mill Club, and along the North and East side
of Cottonwood Creek to said Rudd premises, said
road extending over the property heretofore and
subsequently used by defendant corporation. That
prior to the acquisition of the premises described
in paragraph 9(a) by plaintiffs Rudd, and their
predecessors in interest, their said premises, together with the Old Mill Property, and the premises upon which the plant operations of defendant are located, and over which all of said road
passed, were owned by the same party, Emerette
C. Smith. That, thereafter, the said Emerette C.
Smith conveyed the premises above described
to the predecessors in title of plaintiffs Rudd,
retaining the balance of said property generally
described above, and on which the road, used from
the cottonwood highway through the parking lot
of the Old Mill Club to the Rudd property, extended. That said road, aforesaid, until it was destroyed subsequent to 1946, was the only means
of ingress and egress to the property of plaintiffs Rudd, and there is presently no means of
access to said property; that plaintiffs Rudd had
acquired and have a right-of-way and easement of
necessity over said road described above in this
paragraph 9 (b), for this purpose. That, in the
operation of said gravel plant, as aforesaid, defendant has caused rocks, boulders, and dirt to
be rolled down the mountainside, and has changed
the .terrain from its original state, and has destroyed said road, so that defendant has blocked
and made plaintiffs' Rudd property inaccessible,
by obstructing said road, and said means of ingress and egress, thereby damaging the same,
20
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and rendering the property described in paragraph 9(a) of no value as a home, or for any
purpose.
c. That plaintiffs Charles P. Rudd and
Gladys :M. Rudd, his wife, and Ernest J. Pedler
and Virginia A. Pedler, his wife, and their predecessors in title, have used and maintained the
road above referred to in paragraph 9 (b) for
over 20 years, prior to its destruction by defendant, and such use has been open and notorious,
and under a claim of right. That said road runs
through woodland or unimproved and unfenced
property.
10. That the operation of said gravel pit
extends throughout the spring, summer, and fall
of the year, generally, and is subject, generally,
to weather conditions; so that said plant is not
operated when the ground is covered with snow,
or during the presence of excessive rain and
moisture. That said plant commenced operation
in June of 1948, and that, during the year 1948,
its operation was intermittent and sporadic. That
the operation of the plant during the year 1949
was more steady than in the previous year, and
that its operation, during 1950, has been daily,
when weather conditions permitted.
11. That substantial deposits of sand and
gravel exist on both sides of Cottonwood Creek
at the entrance to Cottonwood Canyon.
12. That plaintiffs have not been guilty of
laches, nor have they acquiesced in the construction and operation of said gravel plant, nor have
they been estopped from prosecuting this action,
as alleged by defendant, or at all.
13. That, unless restrained, defendant intends to and will continue such operation, and
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perpetuate the foregoing conditions, resulting in
the annoyance and damage to plaintiffs, as aforesaid.
14. That pursuant to the pre-trial order
made herein on or about October 6, 1950, the
question of damages suffered by plaintiffs as
the result of the operation of said gravel plant,
as aforesaid, both past and prospective, are reserved until the final determination by this court,
or the Supreme Court of the State of Utah, on
the issues presented for trial herein on the question as to whether or not defendant has been
guilty of operating and maintaining an actionable nuisance. A.nd, in the event the foregoing
findings are sustained, the respective actions fordamages, past and prospective, by each plaintiff,
shall be further prosecuted by said parties, with
jury if requested, by filing further pleadings and
proceedings thereupon.
From the foregoing findings of fact, the court
derives _and makes the following
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. That plaintiffs, and each of ,them, are
entitled to a decree and order of this court
promptly restraining, by injunction, the defendant, its officers, servants, agents, or assigns, from
maintaining, using, or operating said gravel pit,
processing plant, and sand, gravel and aggregate storage piles used in connection therewith,
so as to create a nuisance, or permitting such use
or operation, so as to create a nuisance on the
lands and premises of plaintiffs, as hereinabove
described in said findings of fact.
2. That plaintiffs Rudd are entitled to a
decree of this court requiring defendant to provide a right-of-way from a public highway to
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the pren1ises of plaintiffs Rudd, as hereinabove
described in paragraph 9; said right-of-way to
be of such size, condition, and extent as to be
suitable for use by motor vehicles. And, in this
connection, that an order restraining defendants,
its officers, servants, agents, and assigns, from
interfering with or obstructing said right-of-way.
3. That plaintiffs are entitled to an order
of this court, which order shall provide that this
court shall retain jurisdiction of this action for
the purpose of determining, by further pleadings
and conducting further hearings, with jury if requested, the issue of damages, past and prospective ; such issue to be determined upon the final
determination of the question of whether or not
an actionable nuisance has been maintained by
defendant in the manner alleged and contained
in the foregoing findings of fact.
4. Plaintiffs are entitled to their taxable
costs herein incurred.
JUDGMENT AND DECREE
1. That defendant J. B. and R. E. Walker,
Inc., its officers, servants, agents, and assigns be
and hereby are forever enjoined and restrained
from maintaining, using, or operating, or permitting the use or operation of a gravel pit and
processing plant used in connection therewith for
the processing of sand and gravel, including the
storing or stockpiling of sand and gravel thereat
and the operation of heavy equipment upon said
premises, in the vicinity of the common section
corner to Sections 23, 24, 25 and 26, Township
2 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, so as to create a nuisance affecting plaintiffs,
their lands, homes, premises, and use thereof,
arising from objectionable noise, dust, and flash-
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ing lights as found by the court and in the manner
and as more particularly set out and described in
the findings of fact on file herein. That said lands
and premises of plaintiffs are located in Salt
Lake County, State of Utah, and substantially
within the limits of the following described real
property:
Beginning at a point where the East
line of Section 26, Township 2 South,
Range 1 East intersects Big Cottonwood
Creek, which is approximately 475 feet
South from the Northeast corner of said
Section; thence Northwesterly along the
center of said Creek 340 feet, more or less,
to the West line of the Pherrel Draper
property; thence South go 21' West 350
feet, more or less, to Big Cottonwood
Road; thence Southeasterly along said
road 375 feet, more or less to the East
li:n:e of said Section 26 ; thence North along
said Section line 180 feet, more or less;
thence South 71° 40' East 250 feet, more
or less, to East line of Jack C. Dunn property; thence North 17° East 204 feet, more
or less, to center of Big Cottonwood Creek;
thence Northwesterly along the center line
of said Creek 400 feet, more or less, to
beginning.
ALSO : Commencing South 27° 39'
East 246.18 feet from the Northwest corner of Section 25, Township 2 South; Range
1 East, Salt Lake Meridian; thence South
49° 25' East 242.13 feet; thence South 29°
41' West 219 feet to center of Big Cottonwood Creek; thence along Creek North24
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

westerly about 273 feet, more or less;
thence North 39° 13' East 268 feet, to
beginning.
ALSO: Commencing at a point which
is South 57° 39' East 228 feet and South
50° 47' East 200 feet and South 67° 54'
East 200 feet from the Northwest corner
of Section 25, Township 2 South, Range 1
East, Salt Lake Meridian, and running
thence South 48° 10' West 290 feet; thence
South 61 o 47' East along center of Big
Cottonwood Creek 170% feet; thence North
34° 7' East 250 feet; thence North 47° 57'
West 100 feet, to beginning.
This decree shall inure to the benefit of plaintiffs' successors and assigns.
2. That Charles P. Rudd and -Gladys M.
Rudd, his wife, are hereby granted a right-of-way,
as against this defendant, to the hereinafter described premises from a public highway. Said
right-of-way is to be of such size, condition, and
extent as to be suitable for use by motor vehicles.
And defendant, its officers, servants, agents, and
assigns are hereby enjoined from interfering with
or obstructing said right-of-way.
That the property owned by Charles P. Rudd
and Gladys M. Rudd, his wife, above referred to,
is located in Salt Lake County, State of Utah,
and more particularly described as follows:
Commencing at a point which is South
57° 39' East 228 feet and South 50° 47'
East 200 feet and South 67° 54' East 200
feet from the Northwest corner of Section
25, Township 2 South, Range 1 East, Salt
Lake Meridian, and running thence South
48° 10' West 290 feet; thence South 61°
25
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

47' East along center of Big Cottonwood
Creek 1701f2 feet; thence North 34° 7' East
250 feet; thence North 47° 57' West 100
feet, to beginning. Containing 0.8 acre.

3. That defendant, its officers, servants,
agents, and assigns are hereby ordered to restore
or provide a right-of-way, as above described,
immediately.
4. That this court shall retain jurisdiction
of this action for the purpose of determining, by
further pleadings and conducting further hearings, with jury if demanded, the issue of damages,
past and prospective; such issue to be determined
upon the final determination of the question of
whether or not an actionable nuisance has been
maintained by defendant, in the manner set out
in the findings of fact on file herein.
5. The effective date of this decree shall
be five days from its signing.
6. Plaintiffs are hereby granted and awarded their taxable costs herein incurred."
The foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law,
and Judgment were signed and filed on March 9, 1951
(R. 60, 69). Within the time allowed by the Rules of
Civil Procedure, to-wit, on March 17, 1951, the defendant served and filed its motion for a new trial and to
amend the Judgment (R. 71, 72). On April 5, 1951, the
Court denied defendant's motions (R. 75). On March
9, 1951, defendant served and filed its notice of appeal
(R. 76), and on said date deposited with the Clerk of
the trial court the sum of $300.00 in cash funds legal
tender of the United States of America in lieu of the
undertaking for damages and costs required by Section
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104-41-7, Utah Code Annotated 1943 (R. 77, 84). The
Supreme Court on June 5, 1951, entered its order extending time to file record on appeal in the Supreme Court
to August 2, 1951 (R. 82, 83). On July 31, 1951, the record
on appeal was filed in the office of the Clerk of the
Supreme Court (R. 84).

ARGUMENT

L
THE COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR WHICH VITALLY AFFECTS DEFENDANT'S
RIGHTS BY ITS (1) DENIAL OF DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO STRIKE ALL EVIDENCE RELATING
TO THE ALLEGED RIGHT OF WAY OVER LAND
OF WHICH DEFENDANT WAS IN POSSESSION;
(2) OVER-RULING OF DEFENDANT'S OBJECTIONS TO THE ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE AS
TO THE CREATION, EXISTENCE AND OBSTRUCTION OF SUCH RIGHT OF WAY; (3) FINDING
THAT A RIGHT OF WAY BY NECESSITY WAS
CREATED AND EXISTED FOR THE BENEFIT OF
LAND OWNED BY THE PLAINTIFFS RUDD, AND
(4) ADJUDICATING THAT PLAINTIFFS RUDD
ACQUIRED A RIGHT OF WAY OF NECESSITY
FOR THE BENEFIT OF THEIR SAID LAND.
There has been set forth at pages 12 and 13 hereof
certain allegations contained in plaintiffs' complaint with
respect to alleged obstruction by defendant of roads and
lanes, which it is alleg-ed, afford ingress and egress to the
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property of plaintiffs. These allegations are of particular importance in the discussion which follows m
support of Point I of defendant's argument.
In connection with these allegations, note should
be made of the fact that defendant, prior to answering
plaintiffs' complaint moved the Court for an order requiring plaintiffs to make their complaint more definite
and certain with respect to the exact location of the
rights of way, paths and other means of ingress and
egress to the property of plaintiffs which they alleged
were obstructed and blocked by defendant's action as
alleged in Paragraph 7 of the complaint and also set
forth the exact location of the obstructions or impediments to the use of said rights of way and means of
ingress and egress (R. 12). By order of Court, dated
March 10, 1950, defendant's motion was denied (R. 19).
Simultaneously with the serving and filing of its answer
(R. 20, 21) defendant pursuant to and under the authority of Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, propounded to the plaintiffs certain interrogatories among
which were the following:
"4. Will the plaintiffs set forth the exact
location of the rights of way, paths and other
means of ingress and egress to the property of
plaintiffs which they allege in Paragraph 7 of
their said complaint to have been obstructed and
blocked by defendant's action~" (R. 23).
"5. Will the plaintiffs set forth the exact
location of the obstructions and impediments to
the use of said rights of Way and means of ingress
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and egress which they allege in their said complaint to have been erected or constructed by the
defendantf' (R. 23).
All of the plaintiffs, except plaintiffs Rudd, made
answer to Interrogatories 4 and 5 above set forth in this
language:
"4. Answering Interrogatories 4 and 5 these
plaintiffs state that the right of ways involved
belong mainly to plaintiffs Rudd, who have heretofore answered and Plaintiffs Pedler adopt the
answers of plaintiffs Rudd." (R. 28).
The plaintiffs, Rudd, answered the foregoing Interrogatories 4 and 5 as follows:
"4. Answering the fourth Interrogatory, the
plaintiff states that the exact location of the said
right of way cannot be accurately stated because
the ground over which it passed has been excavated but that the said right of way passed from
the southerly end of the old mill property in a
southwesterly direction until it joined with the
part of the road which still remains and such
right of way northwesterly from the plaintiff's
property, and that said right of way at all times
was easterly and northerly from the Big Cottonwood Creek and ran somewhat parallel to the
same although at varying distances to the eastward and northward from the said Creek." (R.
26).
"5. Answering the fifth interrogatory, this
plaintiff states that the stockpiles which covered
the ground to the north and east of the said Creek
but below the hill were part of the obstruction
and the uneven ground left after excavating
where the road ran, was one of the impediments."
(R. 26).
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On September 6, 1951, a pre-trial was conducted by
the trial judge and resultant thereon on said date he
made, entered and filed his pre-trial statement and order
(R. 30, 31). The pertinent part of said pre-trial order
follows:

"I.
It was stipulated; and the Court also determined:
(1) That the Court find and determine whether
the operations of the defendant constitute or
result in a nuisance, and if so,
(a) Whether there should be a complete injunction preventing the defendant from
continuing its operations; and in the
event the Court finds that the defendant
should not be enjoined from continuing
its operations, then,
(1) What limitations, if any, should be
imposed upon the defendant to eliminate the nuisance or reduce it to a
minimum and thus permit the defendant to continue its operations;
(2) The Court to determine what
changes and adjustments should be
made in the defendant's operations
to reduce the nuisance factor and
permit the defendant to continue its
operations.
(2) The question of damages to be reserved for
subsequent pleadings and hearings upon
which damages, past and prospective, will be
determined in the event there is a nuisance.
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n.
It was stipulated between the parties that the
Court strike from the complaint the following
language contained in the last line of Paragraph
2 thereof:
"and is maintained on land owned by Mary
Goff Walker"
and said portion was ordered stricken by the
Court.

liT.
It was stipulated and ordered pursuant thereto, by the Court, that the defendant have access
to the plaintiffs' property for purposes of making
a survey, and that the plaintiff may use the survey for evidence and may also use the survey for
reference ten days prior to the trial of this case.''
Attention is invited to Exhibit 1 (R. 90, 821) and
Exhibit NNN (R. 566) for information as to the location
of the property owned by the Plaintiffs Rudd and Pedler
respectively. These properties are identified on these
plats and maps with respect not only as to their exact
location, but also with respect to their proximity to the
Walker deposit and adjacent land of which defendant
is and was in possession. It is also believed that Exhibit
CCCC (R. 452), which shows the location of the stock
piles of sand and gravel will be helpful in understanding
the facts involved in the present discussion.
It is to be noted that only the plaintiffs, Rudd and
Pedler, are immediately concerned with the matters here
involved, which pertain to the alleged obstruction and
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blocking by the defendant of an alleged existing road
affording ingress and egress to the properties of these
plaintiffs to and from the Big Cottonwood Highway.
The general location of this public highway is shown
upon the exhibits to which immediate reference has been
tnade.
A substantial part of the evidence received by the
trial court on behalf of both plaintiffs and defendant
pertained to this matter. For convenience of the appellate court, the defendant and appellant believes it desirable to here set forth the page references of the record
on appeal where this evidence will be discovered. Insofar
as possible, the identity of the witnesses presenting testimony on this issue is set forth:
Plaintiffs' Evidence
Name of Witness
Pherrel Draper

R. L. Reinsimar
J. :e. Dunn
Henry L. Butler
Walter R. Hansen
Jack C. Dunn
Charles P. Rudd
Glen Rudd
Ernest J. Pedler
Juliet Crisman Dunn
Evelyn P. Shelton
Keith Brown
William G. Shelton

Record Reference
R. 209, 211, 213, 646, 647, 1620, 1701,
1702.
R. 341-343, 354-357, 359.
R. 372, 388.
R. 520-523, 527, 530-539.
R. 542-5'45.
R. 545, 551-553, 557.
R. 565, 580, 649, 653-657, 660-662,
1541-155'4.
R. 582, 585.
R. 594-603. 620, 1560-1570.
R. 1419, 1428.
R. 1431-1438.
R. 1518-1535.
R. 1536-1539.

Defendant's Evidence
John R. Stewart' ··
J. B. Walker
William Aligier
Milton Pedler
Arthur P. Lakin·

R. 673-693;
R. 1042-1067, 1074-1084, 1093-1129,
1142-1147, 1198-1216, 1220-1226,
1710-1713, 1717-1723.
R. 962-1019.
R. 1246-1257, 1262.
R. 1355-1357.
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The plaintiffs and defendant entered into a stipulation (R. 729) covering the chain of title of the tract and
parcel of land owned by plaintiffs Rudd as delineated
and set forth on Exhibit NNN. Said stipulation appears
in the record of trial as Exhibit VVV. For an understanding of the facts stated in the stipulation, it is necessary to refer to the abstract of title, which was introduced in evidence (R. 1206) as Exhibit QQQ. Below is
set forth the pertinent part of said stipulation to which
has been added in the extreme right hand column the
reference to the entries in the abstract, Exhibit QQQ.
''STIPULATION
1. The plaintiffs, Charles P. Rudd and Gladys M.
Rudd, obtained their title through the following instruments recorded in the office of the Salt Lake County
Recorder, as follows:
Date of Deed
Date Ack.
Date ReGrantor
Grantee
corded
Utah Light Emerette C. 12-28-26
& Traction Smith
1-27-27
5-28-27
9-24-24
Emerette C. Fannie
4-25-27
Smith
Horsley
11-26-27
Gladys M.
Rudd
Anne F.
Rudd
11-15-45
Fannie A.
Chas. P.
5-20-47
Horsley
Rudd
5-29-47
Annia Foul- Gladys M.
ger Rudd
Rudd

Recording Abstract
Data-Bk. Reference
and Page
Ex.QQQ
31-81
Abst. No.1
Entry No. 76
31-264

Abst. No.1
Entry No. 63

540-313

Abst. No. 1
Entry No. 74
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2. That all of the land in the Big Cottonwood Creek
Bottoms between the Creek and the hill below the W asatch Boulevard and between the Old Mill and the Rudd
Property was conveyed as follows:
Date of Deed
Date Ack.
Recording
Date ReDate-Bk.
corded
and Page

Grantor

Grantee
Emerette C. 12-28-26
Smith
1-27-27
5-28-27
Emerette C. Old Mill
5-20-27
Smith
Tavern, Inc. 5-21-27
5-28-27
Old Mill
Willard
3-24-33
Tavern, Inc. Smith
3-24-33
(By Execu3-27-33
tion Sale)

Utah Light
& Traction
Co.

Mary Goff
Walker

8-5-33
8-5-33
8-10-33
Old Mill
S. N.Jacob- 3-22-38
3-22-38
Tavern, Inc. sen
(By Execu3-23-38
tion Sale)
Willard
Smith

S. N. Jacob- Mary Goff
sen
Walker

7-15-38
7-15-38
7-16-38

31-81

Abstract
Reference
Ex.QQQ
Abst. No.1
Entry No. 94

31-82
108-546

119-211
206-577

212-5'64

Abst. No.1
Entry No. 97
Abst; No.1
Entry No. 138
Same as No.
303 in Abst.
No.2
Abst. No.1
Entry No. 142
Abst. No. 1
Entry No. 165
Same as 313
in Abst. No.2
Abst. No. 1
Entry No. 173

3. That Mary Goff Walker is the wife of the president, one of the principal stockholders of the Plaintiff
Corporation."
Early in the trial it became obvious that plaintiffs,
Pedlers and Rudds in order to sustain the charge that
the defendant through its operations had obstructed
roads and lanes and was thereby committing a nuisance,
endeavored to quiet title to an alleged right of way over
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lands in the occupancy of defendant. The evidence to
which defendant and appellant has referred on pages ....
of this brief had the objective of establishing a right of
way for the benefit of the Rudds' land and the Pedlers'
land either by (a) proving that a prescriptive right
had accrued, or (b) that a right of way of necessity had
been created. In order for the plaintiffs to succeed on
the nuisance aspect of the alleged obstruction of roads
and lanes, they undertook first to secure from the Court
a decree establishing the right of way which they claimed
had been obstructed by defendant, and thereby created
a nuisance. The defendant and appellant, when it became
apparent that the plaintiffs were claiming that defendant
had obstructed a right of way which had no acknowledged
or admitted legal existence, and were first endeavoring to
establish the legal existence of a right of way upon
which to base the charge of nuisance, entered its objection to this proceeding and this type and kind of evidence (R. 211). The following colloquy occurred:

"Q.

(By Mr. J. Richard Mulliner) Is that roadway in existence at the present time, Mr.
Draper~

A.

Well, the gravel fill is used there up as far
as the stock piles.

Q. By gravel fill do you mean J. B. and R. E.
Walker, Incorporated Y
A.

Yes, but from there on it is· obstructed.

Q. And how is it obstructed?
A. Well, these stock piles obstruct it in the beginning.
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GENERAL RITER: Now if the Court please,
I wanted this interrogation to get along that far
to give me a chance to make my record and objection. There is no evidence here to show that
Pedler or any of the plaintiffs had any right to
use that roadway.
THE COURT : There is no evidence showing
there is a right of way.
GENERAL RITER: No evidence showing
there is a right-of-way.
THE COURT: The Court will grant that.
GENERAL RITER: I move to strike this
entire evidence at this time because there must be
evidence to show their right to use it, and the
records, as they now stand, show there has been
no right, no title.
MR. J. RICHARD MULLINER: I expect to
tie that up, your Honor.
THE COURT: The motion will be taken under advisement. The Court will determine whe~
ther or not there is any evidence on the subject
before ruling on it." (R. 211).
Thereafter defendant and appellant moved the court
for an order striking all evidence having for its purpose
the establishment of this right of way and at the same:
time defendant and appellant objected to the admission
of any evidence pertaining to the establishment of a
right of way either by prescription or of necessity
(R. 651, 652, 653). The ~ourt denied this motion and
overruled the objection (R. 653). But the court ordered
that:
"The record may show the defendant's objection to all .this whole line of testimony, even
though the specific objection isn't made to each
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question and answer. The objection is overruled.
Go ahead." ( R. 653).
During the entire course of the trial the defendant
objected to the admission of evidence of this nature.
At the conclusion of the trial defendant and appellant
renewed its motion to strike this entire line of testimony
and evidence (R. 1738, 1739, 1740, 1744, 1745). By minute
order of the court dated January 23, 1951, this motion
was denied (R. 54). In its motion for a new trial and
to amend judgment, defendant and appellant specifically
asked the court to strike Paragraph 9 of the Findings
of Fact, Paragraph 2 of the Conclusions of Law and
Paragraph 2 of the Judgment (R. 71). Pursuant to Rule
75 (d) and (p), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the defendant and appellant does hereby assign as error the
inclusion in the judgment of Paragraph 2 thereof awarding the plaintiffs Rudds a right of way of necessity over
and across land of which defendant was in possession
(R. 59), and does also assign as error the inclusion in
the Findings of Fact of Paragraph 9 thereof wherein
the court found in favor of the plaintiffs Rudd on the
question of the existence of a right of way of necessity
(R. 65.). Attention is specifically invited to the fact that
the Court refused to make a finding that a prescriptive
right of way had been acquired (R. 54). The finding
above mentioned pertains to a right of way of necessity
only. Therefore, the question of a prescriptive right of
way is not under consideration on this appeal because
the plaintiffs did not cross appeal on this issue. It is
manifest from. the foregoing that defendant and appel37
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lant preserved during the course of the trial, its right
on appeal to assign as error the various actions of the
court in connection with the matter of a right of way
ove.r the land which defendant occupied.

1. The pleadings in this action did not raise
issues as to the creation of a right of way of necessity
over and across land of which defendant was in possession for the benefit of land owned by Plaintiffs
Rudd. Consequently, evidence as to the operation of
said right 10f way and its existence was inadmissible
and without the issues of the action. The Finding of
the Court as to the creation and existence of said
right of way and the provision of the judgment
awarding such right of way for the benefit of t!:e
land owned by plaintiffs Rudd are erroneous in that
they are not based upon supporting allegations of
the pleadings.
There is quoted above the allegations of the complaint which the trial court apparently considered were
sufficient to raise the issue as to the legal existence of
this right of way. There is also quoted above the responses of plaintiffs to the interrogatories propounded
by defendant and appellant as to the location of said
right of way and the nature of its obstruction. It is the
contention of defendant and appellant that the allegations of the complaint, when considered with the responses to the interrogatories, cannot raise this issue,
and that the injection of it into the case under the status
of the pleadings is an error of such weight and importance as to vitiate plaintiffs' judgment. The quantum of
the evidence presented at the trial by the plaintiffs on
this subversively raised issue predominated the proceed38
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ing. A reading of the testimony and a study of the evidence is highly convincing that this evidence largely
entered into the court's ultimate decision not only on the
question of legal existence of this alleged right of way,
but as to the overall question of the maintenance of the
nuisance through the operation of defendant's plant.
In this connection it is most interesting and probably determinative to note that in th~ court's pre-trial
statement and order to which all counsel agreed, and
particularly counsel for the Rudds, that there is neither
a suggestion nor an implication that the issues to be tried
included one as to the legal existence of a right of way
over the land occupied by defendant and appellant. A
fair and just consideration of this pretrial statement
and order compels the conclusion that the introduction
of this issue into the case came as an afterthought. The
pretrial order and statement easily mislead counsel for
defendant and appellant and as soon as the ,purpose and
direction of evidence as to the right of way became apparent, he commenced his vigorous objections thereto.
In an action to establish a right of way of necessity
plaintiff must allege in his complaint the following vital
facts:
(a) Conveyance of a described parcel of land to
him by the defendant or prior owner;
(b) That defendant or prior owner at time of conveyance owned adjacent-la;nd;
(c) That at time of g-rant to· plaintiff, plaintiff did
not have, and still has no access from his property to a
public highway;.
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(d) That plaintiff's access to his land, and his
egress therefrom is wholly and completely cut off to his
irreparable damage; and
(e) That plaintiff is entitled to a right of way ot
necessity over lands of defendant to the public road.
The fundamental rules governing the creation of a
right of way of necessity and the practice, procedure
and proof required to establish the same in court, is
indicated by the following quotations from acknowledged
authorities:
"Every· way of necessity is founded on a
presumed or implied grant. The necessity does
not in any case create the right. It is only a circumstance resorted to for the purpose of showing
the intention of the parties, and raising an implication of a grant. The right is created by the
change of ownership of a portion. of an estate,. the
portion granted having attached to it, by construction as an incident, a right of way over theportion not granted. 'Such a way is not created
by a mere necessity, but always. originates in
some grant or change of ownership, to which it is
attached, by construction as a necessary incident,
pTesumed to have been intended· by the parties.
• • • A way of necessary can not legally exist,
where neither the party claiming· the way; nor
the owner of the land over which. it. is claimed,
nor any one under whom they or either of them
claim, was ever seized· of both tracts of lands at
the same time; and the· way can only· be· created
when one of the tracts. is. c.onveyed, or the ownership changed by operation of law.' Prior unity
of ownership of the alleged aominanf and servient
estates is necessary. The implication arises when
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one grants a piece of land in the midst of his own.
The grant of a way to reach it is presumed. Moreover, the grantor can not by a subsequent conveyance deprive the grantee of the way. The fact
that there would have been a way of necessity
in the absence of a grant does not deprive a
granted right of way of its incidents as a grant."
(Italics supplied). (Thompson on Real Property,
Perm. Ed., Volume 2, Section 538, page 132).
"The foundation of the rule whereby a ,right
of way of necessity is held to have been impliedly
granted or reserved in deeds is, that it was the
intention of the parties to the deed that the
grantor should convey, and that the grantee should
acquire, the means of enjoying the land conveyed,
and, therefore, that he should have access to it
over other land of the grantor, if the grantee had
no other means of reaching it. * * *." (Italics
supplied). (Thompson on Real Property, Perm.
Ed., Volume 2, Section 539, page 134).

"* * * A privity of estate must exist between
the claimant of the way and the owner of the land
over which the way is claimed. There must have
been at some prior time a unity of ownership of
the two estates which have been severed and a
way of necessity over one created in favor of the
other. * * *." (Thompson on Real Property,
Perm. Ed., Volume 2, Section 545, page 143).
"A way of necessity is an easement arising
from an implied grant or implied reservation;
it is the result of the application of the principle
that whenever a party conveys property, he conveys whatever is necessary for the beneficial use
of that property and retains whatever is necessary for the ,beneficial use of land he still possesses. A way of necessity usually arises where
there is a conveyance of a part of a tract of land
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of such nature and extent that either the part
conveyed or the part retained is entirely surrounded by the land from which it is severed
or by this land and the land of strangers. It is
a universally established principle that where a
tract of land is conveyed which is separated from
the highway by other lands of the grantor or
surrounded by his lands or by his and those of
third persons, there arises, by implication, in
favor of the grantee, a way of necessity across
the premises of the grantor to the highway. In
other words, if one grants a piece of land in the
midst of his own, he thereby impliedly grants a
way to reach it. A rule of sound public policynamely, that lands should not be rendered unfit
for occupancy or successful cultivation-supports
the implied grant or reservation of ways of necessity. These ways are of common-law origin.
"The fact of the necessity of a way is of great
importance in determining whether an easement
of way should be implied. The courts do not
agree on the degree of necessity requisite to an
implied grant of a way of necessity. The basis
of the implied easement is the presumption of a
grant arising from the circumstances of the case.
Necessity does not of itself create a right of way,
but it is said to furnish evidence of the grantor's
intention to convey a right of way and, therefore,
raises an implication of grant. This presumption
of a grant, however, is one of fact and whether
a grant should be implied depends upon the terms
of the deed and the facts in each particular case.
* * *." (17 Am. Jur. Easements, Section 48, pp.
959-961).
"The courts are not in complete harmony as
to the degree of necessity that is required to authorize an implied grant or reservation of a way
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of necessity. There is abundant authority in support of the proposition that ways of necessity are
ways of strict necessity as distinguished from
ways of n1ere convenience and that the degree of
necessity requisite to support such a way is absolute necessity, for which inconvenience without
more does not suffice. * * *." (17 Am. Jur. Easements, Section 50, pp. 963, 964).
"A way by necessity is a temporary right in
the sense that it continues only so long as the
necessity exists, varies as the necessity varies,
and ceases to exist upon the termination of the
necessity which gave rise to it. The necessity
ceases within this rule upon the acquisition by
the owner of such right of way of another mode
of passage to the highway-as, for example, when
a new public highway is opened to his land or
when he acquires another way to the highway
through the purchase of other lands. It has been
held, however, a right of way by necessity is not
extinguished by the acquisition of another private
way of equal convenience." (17 Am. Jur. Easements, Section 51, p. 965).
"The rule is that one who claims a way of
necessity has the burden of proof of the facts
requisite to an implied grant of an easement of
this kind-such as the necessity of the way and
the absence of another way or means of access
to the property-which he must sustain by competent and sufficient evidence if his claim is to
be upheld." (17 Am. Jur. Easements, Section 54,
p. 967).
"The burden of proving the essential elements entitling a plaintiff to a way of necessity
is upon him; that is, to show that the lands conveyed to him are surrounded by the lands of the
grantor, or by the lands of the grantor and others,
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and that he has no way to reach the public highway or road, except through the lands of the
grantor." (Fox vs. Paul, 158 Maryland 359, 148
Atl. 809, 68 A.L.R. 520, 524).
"In an action for injuring or interfering with
an easement the complaint must allege plaintiff's ·
ownership of the easement in question. According to some decisions it is necessary to set out
the particular manner, whether by prescription,
grant, or otherwise by which the title was acquired, although the weight of authority is to the
contrary, in the absence of some special statutory
requirement, it being held sufficient to allege generally plaintiff's right to the easement and a
violation of this right by defendant. * * •. If the
complaint is based on the theory that a way in
controversy is one of strict necessity, the complaint niust show that plaintiff has no access to
his land from a public highway without going
over defendant's lands***." (19 C.J. Easements,
Section 266, p.l000-1001).
"It is not alleged in the petition that the
plaintiff has not access to his lands from a county
or public road or highway, and we cannot assume
that he has not such access in the absence of some
allegation to that effect. The allegation that he
cannot reach either of the county roads mentioned
in the petition without going through the defendant's fences is. not equivalent to an allegation
that he has no other means of access to a public
highway from his lands * * *. It is at least well
settled that where a party has one way by which
he can reach a public highway, and which affords
him reasonable facilities for possessing, using
and enjoying his own premises, he is not entitled
to another' way as a way of necessity * * *. The
facts stated in the amended petition being insuffi44
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cient to entitle the plaintiff to a way of necessity
for the purpose of ingress to and egress from
his lands to a highway, the demurrer was properly
sustained as to that phase of the case." (Mcllquham vs. Anthony Wilkinson Live Stock Company, 18 Wyo. 53, 104 Pac. 20, 21).
"It is elementary doctrine that a party who
bases his right upon either adverse user or upon
dedication by the owner must plead the facts constituting such right or claim • * •. It should require no argument, however to show that where
one claims an easement over real property he
should set forth his claim in apt terms in his
pleading. In our judgment the allegations in the
· complaint are clearly insufficient to constitute a
right to the use of the strip of ground in question
under the claim of dedication * * *. By again
referring to the allegations of the complaint
hereinbefore set forth it will be seen that it is
not alleged that the alleg:ed use was adverse and
"QD.der- a claim of right * * *. It is equally ch~ar,
. therefore, that the facts pleaded are insufficient to
constitute a right of way by adverse user. The
court therefore erred in overruling the demurrer
to the complaint." (Farr vs. Wheelwright Con_struction Company, 49 Utah 274, 163 Pac. 256,
257).
"In a suit to quiet title to an easement, it is
sufficient to allege ownership generally, and it is
not necessary to show the particular manner in
which title was acquired* * *. An allegation that
plaintiff is the owner of specific real property is
the averment of an ultimate fact and not a conclusion of law* * *. So, likewise, is the allegation
one of ultimate fact that 'defendant and his predecessors in interest have long since established
a right of easement in the land of the plaintiff'
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specifically describing the channel bed of Kay's
Creek and the adjacent land which it is claimed
was overflowed and to which defendant claims an
easement ~ * *. While this is not a model of
pleading, there are sufficient allegations to withstand attack for the first time on appeal * * • ."
(Robins vs. Roberts, 80 Utah 409, 15 Pac. (2d)
340-341).

"• * • and we see no reason why an allegation that the plaintiff is the owner of a described
right of way or other easement over defendant's
land, and that such easement is appurtenant
to plaintiff's land, should not be regarded as a
sufficient statement of the ultimate facts to be
established * * *." (Corea vs. Higuera, 153 Cal.
451, 95 Pac. 882, 17 L.R.A. (NS) 1018).
The most casual reading of the excerpts from paragraphs 6, 7 and 8 of plaintiffs' complaint, heretofore
quoted at pages 12 and 13 of this brief, will show that the
pleader had no intention of raising an issue concerning
the legal existence of a right of way over the land occupied by defendant. This statement finds affirmation in
the prayers of the complaint which read as follows:
"WHEREFORE, plaintiffs pray that the
defendant, its officers, servants, and agents be
permanently restrained, by injunction, from
maintaining, using, or operating said gravel pit
and processing plant, and that defendant be required and ordered by the court to restore all
right-of-ways, paths, and other means of ingress
and egress to their premises heretofore destroyed
by defendant, and be further ordered to restore
the channel of Cottonwood Creek, to the condition
that existed prior to defendant's operation of
said gravel pit, together with damages heretofore
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incurred thereby. And plaintiffs further pray
that if, upon the trial of this cause, an order of
abatement and affirn1ative injunction is not granted by the court, that the damage of each plain tiff
be assessed by the court, and judgment rendered
by the court in favor of each plaintiff for the
depreciated value or loss in value of the property
of each plaintiff herein, and for such other and
further relief in the premises as the court shall
deem just and proper." (R. 4-5).
It is manifest from the foregoing that plaintiffs
were only seeking relief from the alleged nuisance created
by the operations of defendant's sand and gravel plant.
When reference is made to the Pre-trial Statement and
Order (R. 30, 31), the foregoing conclusion secures further confirmation. The allegations of the complaint and
the Pre-trial Order proceed on the basic assumption that
defendant was obstructing roads and lanes appurtenant
to the plaintiffs' properties, concerning which there was
no question as to their legal existence. There is not even
an implication that plaintiffs were giving notice they
intended in this action to litigate any question concerning
the legal existence of a right of way, road or lane. The
responses to def~ndant's interrogatories did not in any
respect set forth any fact which would inform the defendant that plaintiffs proposed to claim and prove a
right to use the alleged road described in the response
of the plaintiffs Rudds by either grant, prescription or
necessity. The response simply described a road and
the alleged obstructions thereof. It is a response based
on the premise of the complaint, and that is, that defend-
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ant was guilty of obstructing legally established roads
of which plaintiffs were entitled to the free, unobstructed
use thereof.
·
When the responses to the interrogatories are read
in connection with the allegations of the complaint it is
obvious that plaintiff wholly failed to allege any cause of
action of the nature litigated over defendant's objections.
The first defect in these allegations is they wholly fail
to allege that plaintiffs are the owners of a described
right of way or other easement over the land of which
defendant was in possession. This pertinent, ultimate
fact as required by Robins vs. Roberts, supra, and
Corea vs. Higuera, supra, is entirely lacking, even though
the response to the interrogatories is considered as part
of the complaint. The absence of this mandatory allegation of ownership of a right of way or easement necessarily and conclusively implied that the road described
in the interrogatory was a public road and not one of a
private nature appurtenant to plaintiffs' land. The absence of this allegation demonstrates clearly the premises
upon which plaintiffs' complaint was drafted and rendered findings of fact and the judgment as the same pertains to this right of way wholly nugatory and void.
There exists another fatal defect in plaintiffs' pleadings which must be overcome if the finding of the right
of way of necessity and the judgment thereon are to be
sustained. Defendant and appellant repeats that the
court rejected the idea that a right of way by prescription had ripened. In its Minute Order of January 23,
1951 (R·. 54), the court concluded that the use ''was
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permissive and that no easement ripened by adverse
use." The findings and judgment show on their face
that the court adjudicated that a right of way of necessity existed.
The authorities above quoted demonstrate beyond
doubt that to entitle a plaintiff to a way of necessity
he must allege and prove that he has not access to his
lands from a county, public road or highway. M cllquham
vs. Livestock Company, supra, teaches that the absence
of such allegation is fatal. Such allegation is not contained in plaintiffs' complaint nor in the responses of
plaintiffs, and therefore the court's Finding and judgment are based upon a fatally defective pleading. In
this connection defendant and appellant repeats that as
soon as the purpose and direction of plaintiffs' evidence
as to the road or right of way, became apparent, it
objected to the admission of such evidence and throughout the trial it persistently made objection to the court's
procedure with respect to this matter.
It is highly illuminating to refer to Hillyer's "Annotated Forms of Pleadings and Practice" (1938 edition).
In Volume IV. at pages 32-48, is the form of complaint
(No. 4025) to establish a way of necessity over lands
of plaintiff's grantor to connect with a public road.
This form is based upon the case of Gray vs. Magee, 133
Cal. App. 653, 24 Pac. (2d) 948. In this case the court
said:
"A second contention is that the complaint
is fatally defective because of a misjoinder of
parties and actions. In this connection it is
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claimed that an action against Hugh Magee for
a way of necessity over his land is improperly
joined with an action against the other defendants to establish the existence of a public road
over their lands. In order to establish a way of
necessity over the lands of Hugh Magee, it was
necessary for the plaintiff to establish that such
a way would give him access to a public road.
He could do this only by alleging and proving
that a public road existed over the estate lands
which came to the line of Hugh Magee's land.
Only one cause of action is alleged, and all defendants were proper parties." (Italics supplied).
(24 Pac. (2d) p. 951).
Reference is also made to the 1951 Pocket Supplement to Hillyer's accompanying Volume IV. thereof.
At page 46 of the Supplement (No. 4024-5) is the form
of a complaint for interference with easement and way
of necessity. This form is based upon Rose vs. Denn,
188 Ore. 1, 212 Pac. (2d) 1077; 213 Pac. (2d) 810. This
case distinguishes between an easement in the form of a
way of necessity and an implied easement. In the case
of the former it is absolutely essential for the owner of
the dominant tenement to allege and prove that such
way is necessary to afford his lands access to a public
road. In the absence of such allegation and proof, he
cannot succeed in establishing a way of necessity.
When comparison is made of the complaint in this
action in connection with the responses of plaintiffs to
the defendant's interrogatories, with the pleadings in
the Gray and Rose cases, supra, the defects in plaintiffs'
pleadings in this action become glaring. It is submitted
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that plaintiffs' pleadings are fatally defective because
of the absence of the required allegations hereinabove
discussed.
The situation therefore presents two different
aspects. In the event it should be concluded that the
complaint and responses present an issue as to the existence of a way of necessity, they are fatally defective
in that they fail to allege: (1) That plaintiffs are owners
of an easement or right of way and (2) That they have
no other rneans of access to a public highway from their
lands. However, defendant and appellant submits that
the issue as to the existence of a way of necessity was
never raised by the complaint and response, and that as
a result that part of the findings and judgment applicable thereto are wholly without any issue framed by the
pleadings. It is apparent that the plaintiffs face a forked
road, either branch of which leads to the same destination. If the pleadings include an issue as to the existence
of a way of necessity, the complaint and responses
utterly fail to state facts sufficient to constitute a claim,
and as a consequence the pertinent finding and judgment
are void. If the pleadings do not raise such an issue,
the pertinent finding and judgment are without supporting pleadings. In either event Finding No. 9, and Paragraph 2 of the Judgment are erroneous and without legal
effect, and should be so declared.
Of relevancy to this discussion is the provision of
Rule 15 (b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, reading as
follows:
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"When issues not raised by the pleadings are
tried by express or implied consent of the P.arties,
they shall be treated in all respects as if they had
been raised in the pleadings. Such amendment of
the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them
to conform to the evidence and to raise these
issues may be made upon motion of any party
at any time, even after judg1nent; but failure so
to amend does not affect the result of the trial
of these issues. If evidence is objected to at the
trial on the ground that it is not within the issues
made by the pleadings, the court may allow the
pleadings to be amended when the presentation
of the merits of the action will be subserved thereby and the objecting party fails to satisfy the
court that the admission of such evidence would
prejudice him in maintaining his action or defense upon the merits. The court shall grant a
continuance, if necessary, to enable the objecting
party to meet such evidence."
Continuously through the trial the defendant_ and
appellant objected to the admission of evidence pertaining to the creation or existence of the alleged right of
way. Furthermore, defendant and appellant moved to
strike this evidence both during the trial and at the
conclusion thereof. In addition, on its motion fora new
trial and for order amending findings and judgment, it
again ·attacked the admission of this evidence and the
trial of any issue involving said right of way. Beyond
all peradventure, the record on appeal shows that the
defendant and appellant neither expressly nor impliedly
consented to the trial of this issue which had not been
raised by the pleadings or if raised by the complaint
and responses was defectively stated. Conversely the
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plaintiffs insisted that the issue was within the pleadings
and that the pleadings declared a claim on the pretended
issue. At no time did the plaintiffs request an amendment to their cmnplaint as the same pertained to the
right of way in question. There is presented to the appellate court for consideration a situation (a) where an
issue was tried which was "not raised by the pleadings";
(b) where the defendant and appellant neither expressly
nor in1pliedly consented to the trial of this issue; (c)
where plaintiffs and appellees made no offer or request
to amend their complaint so as to present this issue; (d)
where the complaint clearly fails to set forth a statement
of claim to quiet title to a right of way of necessity; (e)
where the defendant and appell~t continuously objected
to the trial of such issue and the admission of evidence
thereon; and (f) where the action of the trial court in
forcing defendant and appellant to trial upon an issue
not within the pleadings, or if within the pleadings was
defectively stated, clearly prejudiced it in maintaining
its defense. (Cf. Woods vs. Seiber, C.A. 5th, 1949, 171
Fed. (2d) 900.
Defendant and appellant en1phatically insists that
the trial court committed prejudicial error in its action
on this aspect of the case. Under no circumstances can it
be upheld under the provisions of Rule 15 (b) above
quoted. If the complaint together with the responses
to the interrogatories, be construed as raising the issue
as to the creation and existence of a right of way of
necessity, plaintiffs must fail because the complaint thus
construed fails to set forth facts entitling them to relief.
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If, however, the complaint is construed as defendant and
appellant believes it should be construed, the court tried
an issue not within the pleadings and to which the
defendant and appellant continuously objected. A fatal
error was therefore committed prejudicing the entire
defense of defendant and appellant.

2. There can be no valid adjudication as to the
existence of a way of necessity without having before
the court the actual owner of the estate over and
upon which such way is imvosed. Mary ·Goff Walker,
the fee title owner of the land upon which said
burden was imposed by the court's judgment was
and is not a party to this action. Consequently, the
adjudication of the court that such way of necessity
was created and exists is erroneous.
It was admitted throughout the trial that the defendant and appellant was not the fee simple title owner of
the land over which plaintiffs' claim a right of way of
necessity, and further, by virtue of the stipulation, Exhibit VVV, as read in connection with the abstract of
title (Exhibit QQQ), it clearly appears that Mary Goff
Walker was at the time of the commencement of this
action, during the· trial, and at the time of entry of
judgment, the fee simple owner of the servient tenement.
The defendant was in possession thereof. under an ar,.
rangement with Mary Goff Walker, the terms and conditions of which were not revealed at the trial. In its
pretrial order and statement, the court struck from
Paragraph 2 of the complaint the following phrase: "and
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is maintaining on land owned by Mary Goff Walker"
(R. 31). The plaintiffs consented to the elimination of
this phrase.
In an action to determine the existence of a right
of way of necessity both the owner of the dominant
estate and the owner- of the servient estate are necessary
parties thereto and there can be no adjudication as to
the existence of a right of way of necessity without
bringing before the court the owner of both the dominant
and servient estates. The reason for this rule is that
a right of way of necessity can only exist where there
was a prior unity of ownership. In such action the lessee
or tenant of the owner of the servient estate cannot
represent the fee owner thereof. In this case, Mary
Goff Walker, is the servient owner and the defendant
corporation is either her lessee or tenant. The determination of the issue as to whether the prior owner of
the Rudd Pedler and the Mary Goff Walker properties
(Emerette C. Smith) intended by her conveyance to
Pedlers' and Rudds' predecessors in title to convey a
right of ingress and egress over the land retained by
her (now the Mary Goff Walker property) can only be
adjudicated when the Rudds and Pedlers and the mesne
grantee of Emerette C. Smith (Mary Goff Walker) are
before the court. Mary Goff Walker was not served with
process in this action and did not appear therem.
"It appears from the evidence that one Toohey owns the Toohey lands, in possession of defendants, upon which plaintiff claims an easement; that is, the right to have the flood waters
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run over the said lands in the Flannery ditch.
As to find for the plaintiff it would be necessary
for the court to conclude that there was such a
burden upon the said lands, it is apparent that
such an easement may not be adjudged in a suit
to which Toohey is not a party." (Italics supplied).
Campbell v. Flannery, et al., 32 Montana 119, 79 Pac.
702-704.

"* * * The answer sets forth and the agreed
statement of facts shows that the 'other premises'
of the defendants, across which the plaintiff, by
the terms of the contract, 'is to have the right
of way,' were, after the execution of the said contract, conveyed by defendants to one C. D. Goodrich, without an express reservation of the plaintiff's right of way across them. Whether Goodrich
was put upon inquiry respecting such right of
way in season to be affected thereby in taking his
deed from defendants does not appear. Defendants' answer states that the plaintiff 'has been at
all times and is now permitted to enjoy a right of
way across these premises at reasonable and
proper times.' The intended meaning of this
statement is not clear. If Goodrich was put upon
inquiry respecting such right of way, then in
equity he stands no better with reference to it
than would the defendants, had they retained the
legal title to the premises * * .* But Goodrich is
not a party to this suit, as he essentially should be
if the. decree is to have effective force on all concerned. On remand of this case, the court of
chancery should refuse. to proceed to make a decree until Goodrich is made a party defendant and
. given an opportunity to be heard. Story, Eq. Pl.,
.Sec. 75. For upon the result of such a hearing
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and determination depends the rights of the
plaintiff as to a right of way according to the
terms of his contract with defendants, and consequently as to his right to damages against them
for failure to perform the contract to the full
extent • • •."
Peryer v. Pennock, 115 Atl. (Bt.) 105, 17 A.L.R.
863-865.
"Where the jurisdiction of equity is invoked
to determine the right to a way of necessity and
to locate it if it is found to exist, all persons whose
rights may be affected by the decision of the question raised should be made parties."
Syllabus, Fox v. Paul, 148 Atl. (Md.) 809, 68 A.L.R.
520-527.
"In an action against defendants for obs.tructing an easement on lands in their possession,
the owner of the land is a necessary party where
the existence of the easement is in issue, since
an easement on land may not be adjudged in a
suit to which the owner of the land is not a party."
19 C.J., page 1000, Sec. 264.
"It is the well recognized general rule that
a tenant has no inherent power to bind the landlord or the reversion by any act or contract
on his part."
32 Am. ~Jur. Landlord and Tenant, Sec. 77,
P. 90. (See also Schwer vs. Martin, 29 Ky. Law
Rep. 1221, 97 S.W.l2, 7 L.R.A. (NS) 614, 616).
Manifestly, the judgment is not binding on Mary
·Goff Walker. She was never before the court and insofar
as she is concerned, the judg1nent is a nullity as the same
pertains to her land title. (Rule 19 (b), Utah Rules of
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Civil Procedure). It is no answer to this proposition
that plaintiffs are satisfied with an adjudication against
the defendant and appellant that a way of necessity
exists, because the defendant and appellant was never
in a legal position to contest the vital issues involved.
Only Mary Goff Walker can raise the question as to
prior unity of ownership; the effect of conveyances by
Emerette C. Smith to predecessors in title of the plaintiffs Rudd and Pedler, and of Mary Goff Walker; the
question whether said plaintiffs have another access to
public roads and highways; and whether the necessity
existed at the time of trial. Insofar as these questions
are involved, there is no privity between the defendant
and appellant and Mary Goff Walker which will allow
the court to pass upon the inherent problems involved
in adjudicating the existence of a way of necessity.
Therefore, on this ground, defendant and appellant submits that the court acted erroneously and such erroneous
actions contributed to the confusion of issues and resulted in substantial prejudice to defendant's and appellant's defense.

3. Where there is reasonable doubt as to the
right or title of the applicant for an injunction to
protect property, equity will not interfere in the
absence of an emergency until after the right or title
has been established at law.
In considering the above proposition, consideration
should be given to Rule 2, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which reads as follows:
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"There shall be one form of action to be
lmown as 'civil action.,"
and to Rule 8 (e) (2), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
which reads as follows :
"A party may set forth two or more statements of a claim or defense alternately or hypothetically, either in one count or defense or in
separate counts or defenses. When two or more
statements are made in the alternative and one
of them if made independently would be sufficient,
the pleading is not made insufficient by the insufficiency of one or more of the alternative
statements. A party may also state as many
separate claims or defenses as he has regardless
of consistency and whether based on legal or on
equitable grounds or on both. All statements shall
be made subject to the obligations set forth in
Rule 1L"
Under these rules a plaintiff may allege in his complaint as many separate claims as he has whether based
on legal or equitable grounds or both. (Baron and
Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure, Vol. 1, Sec.
141, Page 266.)
However, the foregoing rules do not destroy the right
of trial by jury (Rule 38, Utah Rules of Procedure), and
the distinction between legal rights and equitable rights
remain.
"The question whether a right of way over the
lands of one person exists in favor of another is
purely a legal one, and where the existence of
such an easement is in dispute, the proper tribunal
in which to settle it is a court of law." (Mason v.
Ross, 77 N.J. Eq. 527; 77 Atl. 44)
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"The action is in nature to quiet title. The
remedy sought is by injunction, and summary.
The party seeking such relief must show a clear
right. The exact extent and location of the appellant's right of way, as well as its extent of possession, when this action was instituted, is left
in doubt by the conflicting testimony. Upon this
record the relative rights of the parties to this
contention are in doubt. At least, the case is not
clear for the appellant. It is not, therefore, one for
sum1nary equitable intervention." (Newport, etc.,
Turnpike Road Co. v. Fitzsimmons, 9 Ky. L. Rep.
937, 8

s.w. 201).

"Where, in an action to restrain the obstruction of a right of way claimed by grant, the defendant not only denied that the plaintiff had a
legal right of way, for the alleged reason. that the
deed to the plaintiff's grantor did not convey in
express terms any interest therein, but denied as
well the allegation as to obstructing the way and
consequent damage, and it did not appear that the
interferences complained o£ were continuous or irreparable, the plaintiff was required first to es~
tablish his right in an action at law." (Parks v.
Parks, 121 Me. 580, 119 Atl. 533).
"In a suit praying for a judgment that the
plaintiff was entitled to a right of way from his
land over that of the defendant to a public highway and for an injunction to remove obstructions,
alleging title by adverse user for the prescriptive
period, and where the answer denied the plaintiff's right and defendant's evidence tended to
show the user was not adverse, the plaintiff must
first establish the existence of the right of way
in a court of law." (Hart v. Leonard, 42 N.J. Eq.
416, 7 Atl. 865.)
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"• • • The issue between the parties was
purely one as to the title to the easement and'"' '"' •.
although in form this is a suit in equity it is in
reality an action of ejectment to secure the removal of the respondents and their building from
the alleged way. The complainant in her bill alleges that she is the owner of this right of way and
that she acquired it by adverse user for more than
ten years. The respondents in their answer deny
that there is any such easement appurtenant to
her land and that the complainant ever acquired
one by adverse user. '"' • *The only issue left was
as to the title to the easement. The court of equity
had no jurisdiction to try this issue and the ·respondents are entitled to have it tried at law before
a jury." ('\'Vaal v. Sakagi, 27 Haw. 609, 636.)
See also Ferguson v. Ferguson, 106 Kan.
823, 189 Pac. 925 ;
Howell Co. v. Charles Pope Glucose Co., 171
Ill. 350, 49 N.E. 497;
Dahnken v. George Romney <t Sons Co., 111
Utah 471, 184 Pac. (2d) 211, 215 ;
McGregor v. Silver King Mining Co., 14 Ut.
47, 45 Pac. 1091.
"The primary purpose of the instant case
is establishment of an easement based upon an
alleged prescriptive user. If plaintiff fails in this,
his cause of action falls. The right of injunctive
relief cannot come into existence until the easement has been established. This issue the plaintiff
was entitled to have tried to a jury. The court
may grant or refuse the auxiliary relief of restraining interference therewith after the easement has been found to exist. Should the jury find
no easement, under proper instructions of the
court, insofar as plaintiff is .concerned, both in61
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junctive relief and damages cease to be of any
consequence. The determination of the issue as to
whether or not plaintiff has a prescriptive easement over the lands, the title to which is conceded
to be in defendants, is one based on fact. The
question of whether or not the way in question
has been used for more than 20 years, whether or
not the use has been open, adverse, continuous,
visible, notorious, and under claim of right with
knowledge and acquiescence, and not merely permissive or by license, are the basic facts to be
established, and the plaintiff had a right to have
them submitted to a jury. 19 C.J. 965, Sec. 199;
Polson v. Ingram, 22 S.C. 541; Farmer v. Bright,
183 N.C. 655, 112 S.E. 420 * * *. Whether or not
the law courts and the esuity courts were separate
courts, the analogy of the situation is pertinent
to the issues in the instant case. The necessity of
establishing the easement at law before equity
principles or 'equity Jurisprudence,' as distinguished by Pomeroy, may be applied to injunctive
relief, is apparent, although under our procedure
both may be accomplished in the same action • • •.
The mere fact that a suit is one to quiet title to
real property is not controlling. Generally, a suit
to quiet title to real property is regarded as an
equitable proceeding; but because it is so regarded
does not determine the nature of the issue or
deprive a party of his right to a trial by jury.
If the only question involved is that of title, the
issue is generally legal. A suit to establish an
easement is legal." (Norback v. Board of Directors, 84 Utah 506, 37 Pac. ( 2d) 344, 345).
"By analogy, then, it would seem that where,
as under our procedure, parties are permitted to
submit both their legal rights and their equitable
rights to the same tribunal for adjudication at the
62
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

same time, the right to a jury trial with respect
to the former, which was adequately safeguarded
under the old system, should be equally respected
under the new. That would seem to be the effect of
our constitutional guaranty. Article 1, § 7. The
right to trial by jury thus guaranteed was the
right as it existed at common law. Koppikus v.
State Capitol Commissioners, 16 Cal. 248, 253;
Cauhape v. Bank, 127 Cal. 197, 202, 59 Pac. 589.
The purpose of the amendment of 1874 to section
592 of the Code of Civil Procedure was to make it
conform thereto. Vallejo, etc., R.R. Co. v. Reed
Orchard Co., 169 Cal. 545, 556, 147 Pac 238. It
follows, therefore, that the common-law rule respecting the right to trial by jury as it existed
in 1850 is the rule of decision in this ·state. Pol.
Code, § 4468 ; Martin v. Superior Court (Sup.) 168
Pac. 135, 136 L.R.A. 1918B, 313. • • •
"So far as we have been able to ascertain,
there was no statutory enactments in England between 1850 and 1858 affecting the right of trial
by jury in connection with suits to abate nuisances.
These decisions may be taken then as determina~
tive of the proposition that, under the English
common law as it stood in 1850, at the time it was
adopted as the rule of decision in this state, 'If a
plaintiff applies for an injunction to restrain a
violation of a conunon-law right, if either the
existence of the right or the fact of the violation
be disputed, he must establish that right at law';
or, in other words, by a jury, if one be demanded.
We conclude, therefore, th.at the parties here were
entitled to a jury trial upon the issues as to dam~
ages, and that the verdict of the jury thereon was
binding. We do not regard the provision of section 731 of the Code of Civil Procedure as in any
way affecting that right. If the jurisdictions in
63
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

la~ and equity were here separately vested, it

m1ght well be held that the plaintiff, by filing in
equity a complaint such as is here presented, had
thereby elected to submit all the issues for determination by the court, and thereby waived his
right to a jury trial on the legal issues; but where,
as here, all such issues may be tried in the one action, no reason for such holding appears." (Farre~l
v. City of Ontario, 39 Cal. App. 351, 178 Pac. 740742.)

"The decision in Farrell v. City of Ontario,
supra, was followed and approved only a few
weeks later by the case of Franklin v. Southern
Pacific Company, 40 Cal. App. 31, l80 P. 76, in
which likewise the judgment of the trial court waa
reversed. The decision in this later case was by
the same court which rendered the decision in the
case of Farrell v. City of Ontario, supra. A petition for a hearing after said decision was denied
by the Supreme Court. It is interesting to note
that the author of the opinion in the first of these
two cases, was the trial judge in the later case.
• * • In our opinion, the argument and presentation of authorities cited by Judge Myers in his
opinion rendered in the Farrell case, are unanswerable and the rule therein announced should
be followed by the courts of this state in actions
wherein both legal and equitable remedies are the
subject of the action." (Pacific Western Oil Co.
v. Bern Oil Co., 13 Cal. App. (2d) 60, 87 Pac.
(2d) 1045-1050.)
"Thus we conclude that the court below erred
in not according to the defendant,. upon his demand, a jury trial on the issue of damages. As
has been seen, the trial judge denied the defendant the right to a jury trial on any and all issues
on the ground that the paramount object of the
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plaintiff's action was to secure an injunction and
that the claim for damages was· but incidental to
the injunctive relief sought. In so ruling, the court
apparently relied upon Norback v. Board of Directors of Church Extension Society, 84 Utah 506,
37 P. 2d 339, 345, where the rule was laid down
that 'if the issues are legal or the. major issue
legal, either party is- entitled upon proper demand
to a jury trial; but, if the. issues are. equitable or
the major issues·. to be resolved. by· an application
of equity, the. legal issues being merely subsidiary,
the action should be regarded as equitable and the
rules of equity apply.' In that case suit was
brought by the plaintiff to establish a claimed
easement based upon an alieged prescriptive user,
for an order enjoining the defendant from asserting a claim as against.the plaintiff thereto,. and for
damages. The. court. held that the primary purpose
·of the suit was to establish an easement; that a
suit to establish an easement by· prescription islegal; .that the right of injunctive relief c:ould
not come. into existence until the. easement. had.
been established; that the court could grant or
refuse to grant the auxiliary relief of restraining
interference with the easement after the easement
had been found to exist; and that. therefore tha
parties were. entitled to have the; matter of whether
he. had acquired an easement by prescription. submitted to a jury.
"Appraised in light of the California rule,
[Farrell and Pacific Western cases, supra J the
Norberg case is· apparently correct in result; hut
the· rule· there laid down as. to when litigants~ are.
entitled to a trial by jury; which we· have. quoted
above, cannot be reconciled with the California
rule which we have approved and adopted in this
· opinion. There may be certain types of cases;· ai65
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though none occur to us now, in which the issues
of fact in the legal cause of action are so intertwined with the issues of fact in the equitable
cause of action that they cannot be separated for
the purpose of trial by jury. Only then- would
it seem that the court should determine whether
the major issue or issues are legal or equitable
and grant or deny a jury trial accordingly. Otherwise the parties should be entitled to a jury trial
on the issues of fact in the legal cause of action."
(Valley Mortuary v. Fairbanks, ...... Utah ......, 225
Pac. (2d) 739, 750.)
The trial proceedings in this case deprived the def~ndant of the right to demand a trial by jury_ of the
legal issue as to the existence of the right of way of
necessity. It is true that defendant did not demand a
trial by jury on this issue but the reason for such lack of
demand becomes obvious when consideration is given to
the position which defendant was compelled to take at
the trial. Had defendant demanded a jury trial on this
issue, it would have impliedly consented to the trial of_a
non-pleaded issue, under Rule 15 (h) Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure. When the Court overruled its objections to
the admission of evidence concerning the right of way
and denied its motions to strike such evidence, it ~as not
only committing error with respect to procedural and
eVidentiary measures but also by its ruling itdenied the
defendant its constitutional right to demand a jury trial
on the legal issue~ Stated otherwise, if defend&nt and
appellant had demanded a jury trial it would have done
so at the cost of waiving its contention that the issue
concerning the way of necessity had not been pleaded.
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It was in truth compelled to surrender its right of jury
trial in order to preserve its contention that it was being
forced to trial on a non-pleaded issue. Defendant contends that its rights were radically and seriously prejudiced when it was forced to make this election, and that
the errors of the court with respect to defendant's objections and motions penetrated deeply into defendant's
defense of all issues involved in the case. It is impossible
in a post-examination of the record to determine what
the results would have been had the defendant been
accorded its free election to try the legal issues before a
jury upon a complaint which contained proper allegations
as to the creation and existence as to the way of necessity.

4. The writ of injunction cannot be used to try
title to real estate or an interest there·n. It is not
the province of an injunction to effect a final adjudication of an alleged right based on a disputed title.
It cannot be used to oust one party from possession
of realty and place another person in possession
thereof.
"Since ordinarily an injunction will not lie as
an original and independent proceeding to determine the title to land and is not a proper substitute for an action of ejectment or forcible entry
and detainer, in the absence of some statutory
provision to the contrary, the rule is that an injunction will not issue, the effect of which will be
to take land out of possession of one party and put
it in possession of another, at least until complainant's title has been established at law. • • •." (32
C.J. Sec. 178 (3), page 134.)
"Upon the facts found, this case was presented to the lower court. The plaintiffs, purchas67
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ers, never were in the actual or exclusive possession of the lands to be covered by the lease. The
society, the vendor, was in actual and exclusive
possession when it planted the crops in controversy and continued in possession of the lands
upon which those crops were growing until the
injunction was issued and served. The practical
effect of the injunction as issued was to oust the
society from its possession and install the plaintiffs in possessfon, and for such a purpose injunction is not an available remedy." (194 Pac. p. 142)
(Blinn v. Hutterische Society, 58 Mont. 542, 194
Pac. 140, 142).
"The purpose of this action is not to maintain
a status quo while rights are litigated. Its sole
purpose is to finally adjudicate an alleged right
based upon a doubtful and disputed title. This
is not the province of injunction. 32 C.J. p. 35,
Sec. 15. In fact, its true purpose is to try title.
Where such is the main object of a 'suit, injunction
is not the proper remedy. Tomasini v. Taylor,
et al., 42 Or. 576, 72 P. 324." (Barrios v. Pleasant
Valley, etc., Co., 17 Pac. (2d) (Colo.) 301.)
"This case in our opinion is on all fours with
Smith v. Gardner, 12 Or. 221, 6 Pac. 771, 53 Am.
Rep. 342, which was a suit to enjoin a trespass
upon real property, wherein the defendant justified on the ground that the place where the trespass was. committed was a public highway.. The
court held that the manifest object of the suit
was to determine whether a highway existed
.. across the lands of the plaintiff, and that equity
did not have jurisdiction to try and determine that
question, but plaintiff's remedy was at law. The
same question is presented here, and it is a matter
of no consequence that in the case cited the highway was claimed by dedication, and in this by
68
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prescription. The decree of the court below is
therefore affirmed." (Tomasini v. Taylor, 43 Ore.
4, 72 Pac. 324.)
"The law is well settled that a court of equity
will not interfere by injunction with the possession
of a party for the purpose of transferring the possession to another." (Montgomery v. ColemanNelson Gasoline Co., 130 Old. 14, 264 P. 895;
Bradham V· Johnson, 195 Old. 275, 156 Pac. (2d)
806, 808.)
Paragraph 2 of the judgment beyond doubt places
the plaintiffs Rudds in possession of part of the land
of which defendant held possession. The court "granted"
a right of way as against this defendant to the Rudd
premises from a public highway; said right of way is
to be of such size, condition and extent as to be suitable
for use by motor vehicles. The defendant, its officers,
servants, agents and assignees are enjoined front
interferring with or obstructing said right of way (R.
59).
Defendant requotes for purposes of emphasis the
statement of the Utah Supreme Court contained in the
Valley Mortuary v. Fairbanks, supra; wherein the court
was considering Norback v. Board of Directors, supra.
It said:
"The court held that the primary purpose of
the suit was to establish an easement; that a suit
to establish an easement by prescription is legal.
That the right of injunctive relief could not come
into existence until the easement had been established; that the court could grant and refuse to
grant auxiliary relief of restraining interference
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·with the easement after the easement had been
found to exist; and that therefore, the parties
were entitled to have the matter of whether he
had acquired an easement by prescription submitted to.a jury." (225 Pac. (2d) 750.)
The complaint in this action sought an injunction
restraining defendants from obstructing roads and lanes.
On that facet of the case it was purely equitable because
the complaint utterly failed to make any· allegations of
the plaintiff's ownership of a way of necessity. As previously stated the premise of the complaint is that defendant was obstructing roads and lanes which had both
legal and factual existence, and which required no court
action to establish or vindicate. The plaintiffs asked the
court to protect their legal right to have legally established roads and lanes kept open to free use by them.
The case made by the complaint and responses to the
interrogatories stops at that point. The effect however
of Paragraph 2 of thejudgment is to "grant" plaintiffs,
Rudds, a way of necessity over lands of which defendant held possession. This provision of the judgment is
a certain and clear violation of the rule that the writ of
injunction is a preventitive remedy only and cannot be
used to try title. The plaintiffs devoted days of trial to
proving the legal right of the plaintiffs to a right of way
when they came into court only asking it to enjoin defendant from obstructing legally established roads and
lanes. It is difficult to conceive of a more violent case of
"government by injunction" than this one. It has all the
evils against which the courts and legal profession have
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protested in connection with the use of the writ of injunction. On this basis the provisions of Paragraph 2 of
the judgment are erroneous and should be so declared.

5. A right of way of necessity exists only so long
as the necessity exists. When the necessity ceases,
the way terminates. Under the state of the pleadings
and trial procedure followed in this case, the issue
concerning the existence of a present necessity with
respect to the Rudd property could not be properly
presented to the court. Its finding on this issue is not
supported by pleading which raised this issue and is
therefore a finding without the issues of the case.
Defendant and appellant never agreed to the trial
of such issue, but objected to and protested against
not only the admissitm of evidence on this issue, but
also of the trial of such issue.
A right of way of necessity over another's land to
a public highway ceases with the necessity which gave
rise to it.
"A way of necessity arises from necessity
alone and continues only while the necessity exists. Unquestionably appellant had a way of necessity across his grantor's ranch until a road was
dedicated to his use; but when that was done his
right to a way of necessity ceased and it matters
not that the old road was more convenient for
his purposes. When it ceased to be indispensable,
the right ceased." (Cassin v. Cole, 153 Cal. 677,
96 Pac. 277, 278.)
"A way created by necessity cannot endure
longer than the cause which calls it into being, and
it is consequently extinguished on the acquisition
of another mode of passage although far less convenient." (9 R.C.L. 815, 816.)
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"No implications of a grant of a right of way
can arise from proof that the land granted cannot
be conveniently occupied without it; its foundation
rests in necessity, not in convenience. A party
cannot have a way of necessity through the land
of another when the necessary way to the highway
can be obtained through his own land, how~ver
convenient and useful another way might be * * *"
(19 C.J. 115, P. 922.)
"A way by necessity is a temporary right in
the sense that it continues only so long as the
necessity exists, varies as the necessity varies,
and ceases to exist upon the termination of the
necessity which gave rise to it." (17 Am. Jur.
Easements, Sec. 51, P. 965.)
"A right of way which exists by necessity is
based upon an implied grant, and a way of neces. sity is provisionally brought into existence by the
necessities of the estate granted. And, if the
grantee has a new way to the estate previously
reached by the way of necessity, the way of necessity is thereby extinguished. * * * A right of way
of necessity is not a perpetual right. It ceases to
exist when the necessity for its continuance
ceases." (Waubun Beach Assoc. v. Wilson,
(Mich.), 265 N.W. 474, 103 A.L.R. 983-989.)
A complete annotation covering the question of
cessation- of easement of way by necessity upon cessation of necessity appears in 103 A.L.R., page 993.
If plaintiffs Rudds ever had a way of necessity upon
or over the lands of which defendant and appellant was
in possession, the question as to whether the necessity
for such way had ceased was never properly presented
to the court because of the lack of appropriate pleadings
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covering the question as to a way of necessity. Defendant and appellant has hereinbefore shown the status
of the pleadings at'1.d has demonstrated that they were
wholly inadequate to allow the court to pass upon this
question. The immediate quotations above support the
proposition that one of the vital elements in a case involving a way of necessity is not only the issue as to the
existence of the necessity when the way was created,
but the continuance of the necessity at the time of trial
and at the date of the judgment decreeing the same. Without pleadings which definitely raised all issues of fact
inherent in such litigation, it was impossible for the defendant to present an adequate defense on this issue. A
reading of the evidence as the same pertains to the right
of way makes it clear that the plaintiffs were primarily
concerned with establishing a right of way by prescription (which effort wholly failed) and the question of the
existence of a way of necessity came as an afterthought
because of the court's rulings which defendant and appellant continuously controverted. Regardless of the evidence submitted, the defendant and appellant was prejudiciously handicapped in making its defense that a
necessity no longer existed for the right ofway. Without
an accurate issue on this question of the continuance of
the necessity, the evidence is utterly lacking in probative
force to sustain the finding of a present necessity. The
evidence pertaining to present necessity is uncohesive,
scattered, and lacks definiteness. Such condition of the
evidence is resultant upon the lack of a definite issue.
Defendant and appellant submits that it was not only
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handicapped in presenting the defense of lack of present
necessity, but also that this lack of definiteness on this
issue served to prejudice its entire defense in the principal cause.

n.
THE COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN ALLOWING PLAINTIFFS TO SERVE AND FILE AN
AMENDMENT TO THEIR COMPLAINT WHICH
INCLUDED ALLEGATIONS CHARGING DEFENDANT WITH MAINTAINING A NUISANCE ATTRACTIVE TO CHILDREN, AND ALSO COMMITTED ERROR IN OVERRULING DEFENDANT'S
OBJECTIONS TO THE ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE
IN PROOF OF SUCH ALLEGATIONS.
1. The doctrine of attractive nuisance is
part of the law of negligence and defines the
duty of the owner or occupant of real property
to guard against the existence or maintenance
on his property of instrumentalities or conditions which are attractive to trespassing or
meddl!ng children of tender age. The doctrine
has no applicati,on in the present action which
is to enjoin or restrain the operations of a lawful business on the the ground that said operations create a condition which annoys plaintiffs and interferes with their rrghtful use of
their property.
The doctrine of "attractive nuisance" is elucidated
by the following authorities.
"The appellant contends that it was not guilty
of negligence in thus maintaining· upon its own
premises, for necessary use in conducting its busi74
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ness, the turn-table in question, and which was
fastened in the usual and customary manner of
fastening such tables; that the plaintiff was
wrongfully upon its premises, and therefore a
trespasser, to whom the defendant did not owe the
duty of protection from the injury received, and
that the court should have so declared, and nonsuited the plaintiff • • •. It is a maxim of the
law that one must so use_ and enjoy hi~ property
as to interfere with the comfort and safety of
others as little as possible consistently with its
proper use. This rule, which only imposes a just
restriction upon the owner of property, seems not
to have been given due consideration in the case
referred to. But this principle, as a standard of
conduct, is of universal application, and the failure to observe it is, in respect to those who have
a right to invoke its protection, a breach of duty,
and in a legal sense, constitutes negligence • • •.
If defendant ought reasonably to have anticipated
that, leaving this turn-table unguarded and exposed, an injury, such as plaintiff suffered, was
likely to occur, then it must be held to have anticipated it, and was guilty of negligence in thus
maintaining it in its exposed position. It is no
answer to this to say that the child was a trespasser, and if it had not intermeddled with defendant's property it would not have been hurt,
and that the law imposes no duty upon the defendant to make its premises a safe playing
ground for children. In the forum of law, as well
as of common sense, a child of immature years is
expected to exercise only such care and self-restraint as belongs to childhood, and a reasonable
man must be presumed to know this, and the law
requires him to govern his actions accordingly.
It is a rna tter of common experience that children
of tender years are guided in their actions by
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childish instincts, and are lacking in that discretion which, in those of more mature years, is
ordinarily sufficient to enable them to appreciate
and avoid danger; and in proportion to this lack
of judgment on their part, the care which must
be observed towards them by others is increased;
and it has been held in numerous cases to be an
act of negligence to leave unguarded and exposed
to the observation of little children dangerous
and attractive machinery, which they would naturally be tempted to go about or upon, and against
the danger of which action their immature judgment interposes no warning or defense." (Barrett v. Southern Pacific Company, 91 Cal. 296,
27 Pac. 666).
"The owner of a thing dangerous and attractive to children is not always and universally
liable for an injury to a child tempted by the
attraction. His liability bears a relation to the
character of the thing, whether natural and common, or artificial and uncommon, to the comparative ease or difficulty of preventing the danger without destroying or impairing the usefulness of the thing, and, in short, to the reasonableness and propriety of his own conduct, in view
of all surrounding circumstances and conditions.
As to common dangers existing in the order of
nature, it is the duty of parents to guard and warn
their children, and, failing to do so, they should
not expect to hold others responsible for their
own want of care. But, with respect to dangers
specially created by the act of the owner, novel
in character, attractive and d3..ngerous to children,
easily guarded and rendered safe, the rule is, as
it ought to be, different." (Peters v. Bowman, 115
Cal. 356, 47 Pac. 599, 14 L.R.A. (NS) 626).
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"We have already pointed out that, as to
adults or children who may come upon another's
premises either by express or implied invitation,
the law imposes the duty upon the owner to exercise .reasonable care for their safety. If, therefore, the owner places something upon his premises which is easily accessible to children, and
which is alluring and attractive to their childish
propensities, and excites their curiosity and de..
sire for play, it, in effect, amounts to an implied
invitation to them to come upon the premises. If,
in connection with the attractiveness, the thing
is inherently dangerous to a child of immature
judgment, it may well be that the owner of premises may, under particular circumstances, be held
liable for his neglect of duty to the child going
thereon by reason of such allurement." (Brown
v. Salt Lake City, 33 Utah 222, 93 Pac. 570, 14
L.R.A. (N.S.) 619, 626).
"In a number of jurisdictions the rule of nonliability to infant trespassers is subject to a well
recognized exception, consisting of a doctrine
variously termed the 'attractive nuisance,' 'attractive agencies,' 'attractive instrumentalities'
or 'turntable' doctrine, or the doctrine of the
'turntable cases,' or of the 'torpedo cases.' This
doctrine imposes liability for injuries to children,
even though they are technical trespassers, where
such injuries are the result of the failure of the
owner or person in charge to take proper precautions to prevent injuries to children by instrumentalities or conditions which he should, in the
exercise of ordinary judgment and prudence know
would naturally attract them into unsuspected
danger. The doctrine originated in an English
case in which one who left a horse .and cart unattended on the street was held liable for an injury
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received by a child while playing on the cart, but
has since been extended far beyond the strict
legal principles involved in that case. In the
United States the doctrine is designated the 'turntable' doctrine or the doctrine of the 'turntable
cases,' because the leading American case on
the subject, in which the doctrine was first recognized by the supreme court of the United States,
involved an injury to a child playing about a
railroad turntable." (45 C.J., Sec. 155, Page 758).
The "attractive nuisance" idea was introduced by
the plaintiffs into this case upon the direct examination
of the witness Pherrel Draper, one of the plaintiffs.
The following is an excerpt from the proceedings:
Q.

(By Mr. J. Richard Mulliner) I will ask
you, Mr. Draper, if you have seen children
in and around and about this plant~

A. Yes.
GENERAL RITER: Now, I move-I object
to that. That is immaterial, it is an immaterial
thing in this issue certainly whether there are
children in and around and about the plant. He
is not standing here as a Juvenile Court protecting children.
MR. J. RICHARD 1\1:ULLINER: I would
like to be heard.
THE COURT: Do you claim an attractiveness?
MR. J. RICHARD MULLINER: That is one
feature.
GENERAL RITER: You haven't pleaded
it, and it is in violation of the cases~
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~IR. J. RICHARD MULLINER: This is my
theory on it.
(Arguments of Counsel).

MR. J. RICHARD MULLINER: I will tie
this in with other witnesses.
THE COURT : I think you ought to plead it
if you do.
MR. J. RICHARD MULLINER: I will ask
to amend if it isn't pleaded.
GENERAL RITER: What is the theory, it is
an attractive nuisance for children Y You can't
raise that.
MR. J. RICHARD MULLINER: I expect to
show the people involved in this neighborhood
have children, and there will be other children,
too, who play in and about these sand piles and
conveyors which present a very dangerous situation which has upset the parents of these children
living there, and an attractive nuisance is a nuisance in and of itself.
GENERAL RITER: The attractive nuisance
doctrine has no place in this case. That was a
doctrine which was introduced purely on a personal injury claim between an injured child and
a dead child and the defendant. It certainly has
no business in a private nuisance case.
MR. J. RICHARD MULLINER: The possibility of this nuisance and attraction I would
like to raise here if it hasn't been raised.
THE COURT: Can you file your amendment tomorrowY
~1R .. J. RICHARD MULLINER: I think so.
I will file it before we recess.
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THE COURT: I think you ought to file it
early. I don't like to try cases without issues.
Suppose you take until Wednesday. The plaintiffs are granted until Wednesday morning to file
an amendment with reference to the attractive
nuisance feature.
GENERAL RITER: May the record show
that on the assumption it is filed, I move to strike
it on the ground it is an irrelevant and immaterial allegation in this type of action and object
to any allegation based on that type of allegation.
THE COURT: Objection overruled.
MR. J. RICHARD MULLINER: In connection with this, rather than recopy the whole complaint can I add a paragraph numbered according
to the grounds in that general paragraph~
THE COURT: The last question please.
(The last question was read by the Reporter).
THE COURT: The objection to the question
is overruled and the answer may stand.
Q. (By Mr. J. Richard Mulliner) How often
generally would you say you had seen them?
A.

I can't say just how often I have seen them
there playing out on the ends of those high
conveyors, and also two or three times I have
taken the little children off of those sand
piles all over that large underground conveyor and warned them of the danger there
would be if they would ever slip into that
cone. It would mean certain death. I have
taken them off two or three· different times.

GENERAL RITER: That is a highly prejudicial line of testimony, and I object to it, if
. the Court please, what this witness did (R. 206209).
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Pursuant to the permission of the court as set forth
in the above quoted excerpt, the plaintiffs served and
filed (R. 312) an amend1nent to their complaint reading
in part as follows :
"That the various operations as described and .
the piling and the piles of sand and gravel constitute an attraction and attractive nuisance and
the loading and caving in are a serious danger to
children who are attracted thereto, which interferes with the safe and comfortable enjoyment of
plaintiffs' properties and lessen the personal enjoyment thereof by plaintiffs or others residing
therein. That the conditions caused and as in this
Paragraph 8 referred to are offensive to the
senses and injurious to the health of the occupants of the properties of plaintiffs as herein
described and involved (R. 35-36).
Defendant objected to the filing of this amendment
to plaintiffs' complaint (R. 312-313). The court overruled the objection (R. 313) and the defendant served
and filed its answer to this amendment wherein it denied
the allegations thereof (R. 49-50).
Thereafter during the course of the trial the plaintiffs persisted in the introduction over defendants objection of evidence in support of this attractive nuisance
theory. Upon the direct examination of Virginia Pedler,
one of plaintiffs' witnesses, the following episode occurred:

Q. Have you observed children playing on these
conveyors and sand piles on the '\Valker property?
81.
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GENERAL RITER: Consistent with my
previous objection, I object to that question.
THE COURT: The record may show an objection to the entire line of attractive nuisance
questions, and the objection is overruled.
A.

Yes, I have seen them.

(By Mr. J. Richard Mulliner) On more
than one occasion?
A. Yes.
Q. And over what period, Mrs. Pedler?
A. I don't remember exactly. I have seen them
several times. I couldn't say at just what
times. They were usually there on a Sunday
afternoon.

Q.

Q. Has it been from 1948, did you observe children out there in that year~
A. Yes. I brought my own children back from
there that year.
Q. And in 1949'
A. Yes.
Q. And in 1950 t
A. Yes.
Q. Has there been more than one occasion in
each of these periods you have seen children
out there~
A. Yes, I have seen boys out on the end of the
conveyors, and I have also seen children on
the piles of material.
Q. And on occasion you have seen your own children over there 1
A. Yes, the first year in particular it was quite
an attraction for them down there; and when82
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ever they were m1ss1ng, that was the first
place we would head by. We have swings
in our place since then to a void this (R. 489490).
When the witness Jack C. Dunn, also a plaintiff, was
on the stand, the following examination ensued:

Q. Have you ever observed children playing on
these sand piles and conveyors at this Walker
plant!
A. Yes, I have, particularly my own observation,
which I called at times to my father to comeGENERAL RITER: Now if the Court please,
here comes this attractive nuisance question
again.
THE COURT: You may have your objection. It is overruled.
MR. J. RICHARD MULLINER: Would you
read as far as he has gone.
(The last answer was read by the Reporter).
THE COURT : Don't tell the conversation,
but just tell what you t5aw.
A. (Continuing) I happened to see some youngsters that I would judge from where I was
standing they were about eight to ten years
of age, at the end of the longest conveyor.
One of them was standing, I should say, well,
I won't give the details. But they were looking, the youngster was looking over at the
cone of dirt below, and there was another
youngster, I should say, half way out of the
conveyor back of it. At that time I did ask
a question on the fact there should be a night
watchman or a day watchman there to keep
youngsters off of it.
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GENERAL RITER: I move to strike that
out.
THE COURT: The motion is granted. The
answer is stricken.
Q. (By Mr. J. Richard Mulliner) Do you have
children'
A. Yes, I have one boy (R. 550-551).
Ernest J. Pedler, one of the plaintiffs was permitted
over defendant's objections to testify as follows:

Q.

(By Mr. J. Richard Mulliner) Have you
ever seen children playing on the Walker
piles and equipment~
A. Yes, sir; I have.
GENERAL RITER: Now I would like my
objection that I have had right from the beginning to that type of question.
THE COURT: The record may show you
have your objection to this line of testimony.
Objection overruled.
THE WITNESS.: On two occasions I have
gone over and pulled my youngest girl from the
closest pile of sand there.
Q. (By Mr. J. Richard Mulliner) And on other
occasions have you seen other children playing?
A.

I have witnessed older boys, perhaps fourteen or fifteen years of age, and I am guessing some on that, but I have witnessed them
out on the end of the conveyors on a Sunday
( R. 620-621).

The doctrine of attractive nuisance operates under
the law of negligence. It is a legal fiction invented by
the courts to reach a situation where immature children
84.
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enter upon property of the defendant and are either
injured or killed. The children in such instances are
technical trespassers, but the hardship of visiting upon
them the rule which is applicable to adults and mature
persons is obvious. Consequently, the courts conceived
the idea that if a property owner knowingly and intentionally created on his premises a situation which usually
attracts children to come upon the premises and play,
the property owner had really invited them to come on
his premises. This allowed the courts to consider the
children as invitees and not trespassers and thereby
mitigated the operation of the rule that:

w• • • no duty exists toward a trespasser
except to refrain from willfully or wantonly
injuring him, and the owner or person in charge
of property is not under any duty to protect
trespassers thereon from injury or to prevent
them from getting into a place or situation of
danger. Accordingly, under ordinary circumstances, there is no liability for injury to a trespasser of whose presence the person whose act
or omission caused the injury, was unaware."
(45 C.J., Sec. 132, P. 742~744).
The term "attractive nuisance" is. a misnomer. It
is not a term of legal art. More correctly the doctrine
should be denominated as that pertaining to "attractive
agencies" or "attractive instrumentalities" (45 C.J., Sec.
155, P. 758). The doctrine is not part of the law of nuisance under Sections 103-41-1 and 104-56-1, Utah Code,
1943. Therefore the admission of this evidence constitutes an error.
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While the court made no specific finding covering
this proposition, the filing of plaintiffs' amendment to
their complaint and the introduction of evidence based
on this amendment, with the court's full approbation
and approval, must have influenced the court in making
the finding :
"That the maintenance and operation of said
gravel pit and processing plant is a nuisance, and,
if continued, will- result in substantial and permanent damage to the lands, homes, personal
properties and health of plaintiffs and result
further in the substantial depreciation of their
said prop·erties and prevents the use and enjoyment thereof and destroys the rental and market
value thereof." (Finding; R. 65).
Considering the fact that on the principal issue of
the case, there was a sharp conflict in the evidence and
the duty was thereby cast upon the court to resolve this
conflict,
the admission of
this evidence was extremely
..
.
.
'
harmful to the defendant and on appeal should be taken
into consideration in measuring the court's findings of
fact and provisions of its judgment relevant to the charge
that defendant's _operation of its gravel plant constitutes a nuisance.
.

DI.
THE BUSINESS OF EXCAVATING ROCK,
GRAVEL, AND SAND BY THE OWNER OR OCCUPANTS OF LANDS BELONGING TO HIM OR IN
HIS OCCUPANCY IS A LAWFUL· AND USEFUL
OCCUPATION. IT IS NOT A NUISANCE PER SE.
A JUDGMENT ENJOINING AND RESTRAINING
.86
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THE OPERATION OF SUCH BUSINESS SHOULD
GO NO FURTHER THAN TO CONTROL THOSE
PARTICULAR FEATURES OF THE OPERATIONS
WHICH MIGHT RESULT IN SUBSTANTIAL INJURY TO ADJOINING PROPERTY OR TO PERSONS RESIDING OR OWNING PROPERTY IN THE
NEAR VICINITY OF THE LAND UPON WHICH
THE OPERATIONS ARE BEING CONDUCTED.
As a preliminary to the discussion of the above
point, defendant submits relevant and appropriate exw
cerpts from decisions and textbooks as to the function
and duty of the trial court in promulgating its judgment wherein and whereby the operations of a business
are restrained or restricted in cases where the plaintiffs assert such operations constitute a private nuisance.
" (d) Every order granting an injunction
and every restraining order shall be specific in
terms ; shall describe in reasonable detail, and
not by reference to the complaint or other document, the act or acts sought to be restrained; and
is binding only upon the parties to the action,
their officers, agents, servants, employees, and
attorneys, and upon those persons in active concert or participation with them who receive actual
notice· of the order by personal service or otherwise." (Rule 65A(d) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure).
"Rule 65(d), prescribing the form and scope
of an injunction or restraining order, is mandatory, and emergency conditions do not warrant
a departure from its express requirements. However, a violation of these provisions will not invariably render an order absolutely void.
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If Rule 65 is obeyed, the court may grant an
injunction in broad terms, especially if the public
interest is involved. In such a case, it has even
. been held that the violations of law not alleged
may be enjoined although this should be done
only in exceptional circumstances.
"Reasons for granting an injunction must be
stated, and the act.s enjoined must also be specified. It is insufficient to enjoin a defendant from
violations 'as charged in .the complaint.' It is
also insufficient merely to. incorporate long and
verbose findings; since the order should furnish
the defendant with a direct and succinct statement of his alleged wrongful acts." (Sec. 1436,
P. 314-315, Barron and Holtzoff, Federal Practice
and Procedure, Vol. 3).
"* * * No authority is required to support
the proposition that the business of excavating
rock and gravel by the owner from lands belonging to him is a lawful and useful occupation, and
cannot be prohibited by legislation except in cases
where the enactment of such legislation may be
found necessary for the protection of the legal
rights of others." (People v. Hawley, et al., 207
Cal. 395 ; 279 ·Pac. 137, 144).
"* * * Applying these well-recognized principles to the ordinance before us, we are unable
to perceive any ground upon which it may be
sustained as a legitimate. exercise of the police
power. It is in no sense a mere regulation as to
the manner in which rock or stone niay be removed from the land· by the. owner thereof, but
is an absolute prohibition of any such removal.
However valuable the rock or stone may be if
removed, and however valueless if not removed,
the owner must allow it to remain in its place of
deposit. Such. a prohibition might be justified,
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if the removal could not be effected without improperly invading the rights of others; but it
cannot be doubted that rock and stone may, under
some circumstances, be so severed from the land
and removed as not in the slightest degree to
inflict any injury which the law will recognize.
So far as such use of one's property may be had
without injury to others, it is a lawful use, which
cannot be absolutely prohibited by the legislative
department under the guise of the exercise of the
police power." (Ex Parte Kelso, 147 Cal. 609 ;
82 Pac. 241, 242).
"• • • And the reasonableness of the zoning
as applied to certain lines of commercial zoning
must be distinguished from the reasonableness
of zoning regulations prohibiting the development
of natural resources. The exclusion of ordinary
business enterprises does not destroy any inherent
property right, and, if not discriminatory, will be
held reasonable and valid. Most such businesses
can be conducted at any other designated place.
But rock and gravel, like any other natural resource, can be obtained only in those particular
areas where the deposit has been lodged by nature.
Therefore, it follows that to absolutely prohibit
the removal of rock, sand, and gravel from one's
own land in an instance where such land is primarily valuable only by reason of the existence
of rock, sand and gravel, might be regarded as an
unreasonable exercise of the police power. TransOceanic Oil Corp. v. City of Santa Barbara, 85
Cal. App. 2d, 776, 789, 194 P. 2d 148. • • • As
affecting the challenged reasonableness of the
action of the City Council in granting respondent
Gregg a Conditional Use Permit, there was testimony that his property is located in an area which
has long been a rock and gravel producing section. That within a radius of a mile and a quarter
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from the subject property are located fifteen
gravel pits, some active and others idle. That
there is a public need for the rock and sand
located on this particular property, and that it
would be compatible with the greatest public
service and the least private injury to expand the
M-3 or unrestricted use zone to include all of the
land in an area in which the Gregg property is
located * * *.
"WhereJ as here, the operations in question
could not be- characterized as a nuisance per se,
the court was justified in following a well established rule of law which provides that under such
circumstances the decree should not enjoin more
than the specific thing which might constitute a
nuisance, as appears from the requirements of the
particularcase. ·Pomeroy's Equity Juris., 2d Ed.,
sec$. 1945, 1948. It is now established law in this
state that the business of excavating rock and
grayel by the owner from land belonging to him
is a lawful and useful occupation, and the regulation thereof should go no further than to control those particular features of the operations
which might result in substantial injury to adjoining property or to persons residing or owning
property in the near vicinity of the land upon
which the operations are being conducted. People
v~ Hawley, 207 Cal. 395, 412, 279 P. 136; In re
Smith,. 143 Cal. 368, 371, 77 P. 180; In re Kelso,
147 Cal. 609, 613, 82 P. 241, 2 L.R.A., N.S., 796,
109 Am. St. Rep. 178 ; Byers v. Colonial Irrigation
Co., 134 Cal. 553, 555, 66 P. 732 ; Vowinckel v.
N. Clark & Sons,_ 216 Cal. 156, 162, 13 P. 2d 733
41: "" ""

·"The court was therefore justified in giving
heed to the aforesaid rule, that in proper cases
it will not enjoin the conduct ·of a defendant's
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entire business where such business is not a nuisance per se if less measure of restriction will
afford plaintiffs the relief to which' they may be
entitled * * •. (Wheeler v. Gregg, 90 Cal. App.
2d 348, 203 Pac. 2d 37, 48, 49, 50, 51).
"• • • As a general proposition it may be
said that dust which substantially interferes with
the comfortable enjoyment of adjacent premises
constitutes a nuisance, provided it is sufficient to
cause perceptible injury to persons or property.
On the other hand, a reasonable amount of dust
in a manufacturing community or industrial district does not necessarily constitute a nuisance
even though it may cause some annoyance, and
this is particularly true where the dust caused
by the operation of a business is only occasional
and the resultant injury slight. In other words,
a given amount of dust in one locality well might
be considered and held to be a nuisance, and not
so in others, all depending upon the particular
facts and circumstances. 39 Am. Jur., Nuisances,
Sec. 57, pp. 339, 340; 66 C.J.S., Nuisances, Sec.
23, p. 777. See annotations in 3 A.L.R. 312; 11
A.L.R. 1401; and 8 A.L.R. 2d 419 • • *." (Hofstetter et al. v. George M. Myers, Inc., 170 Kansas
564 ; 228 Pac. 2d, 522, 526).

"* • • The right to recover damages for injuries occasioned by fumes, gases, dust, smoke,
foul air, etc., being cast upon one's property by
another, in proper cases, is well established. But
the rule of liability is not absolute and the law
does not afford redress for every such discomfort
or annoyance. Extreme rights in this regard cannot be enforced. Of necessity some degree of
inconvenience and annoyance must be endured or
community and social life would be impossible.
It thus follows that what constitutes in law an
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actionable nuisance is always a question of degree.
The cases cited and relied on by the plaintiff
are instances where, under all the circumstances,
the use of the property complained of was held
unreasonable. Here, where the facts and circumstances, both with respect to the origin and nature
of the thing complained of and the degree of its
offense, differ essentially from those of the cases
cited, we have an entirely different legal question.
''While a nuisance, in the ordinary sense in
which the word is used, is anything that produces
an annoyance-anything that disturbs one or is
offensive-in legal phraseology it is applied to
that class of wrongs that arise from the unreasonable, unwarrantable, or unlawful use by a person
of his property. Every person has the right to
the reasonable enjoyment of his property. As to
what is a reasonable use of one's property must
necessarily depend upon the circumstances of
each case, for a use for a particular purpose and
in a particular way, in one locality, that would
be lawful and reasonable might be unlawful and
a nuisance in another. 1 Wood on Nuisances (3d
Ed.) Sees. 1, 2. The test of whether the use of
the property constitutes a nuisance is the reasonableness of the use complained of in the particular
locality. and in the manner and under the circumstances of the case. ·29 Cyc. 1156. A business
which might be perfectly proper in a business or
manufacturing neighborhood may be a nuisance
when carried on in a residential district; and,
conversely, a business which with its incidents
might be considered a nuisanc~ in a residential
district may be proof against complaint where
conducted in a business or manufacturing locality,
although an extraordinary use of property introducing a serious annoyance which directly and
substantially damages the property of another
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or causes unnecessary annoyance to persons in
the vicinity is not justified by the fact that the
place is a manufacturing locality. 29 Cyc. 1157,
1158 • • •." (Dahl v. Utah Oil Refining Co., 71
Utah 1, 262 Pac. 269, 272, 273).
"• • • Where the injury complained of results
from a business which is not per se a nuisance,
it being caused only by reason of the manner in
which the business is conducted or by the surrounding circumstances, it is always proper for
the court so to frame its decree that defendant's
business will not be absolutely prohibited, if this
can be done and still give to plaintiff the relief
to which he is entitled. Collins v. Wayne Iron
Work, 227 Pa. 326, 76 A. 24; 20 R.C.L. p. 482
• • •." (Mclntosh v. Brimmer, 68 Cal. App. 770,
230 Pac. 203, 207).
"• • • In accordance with general rules elsewhere stated, a decree enjoining a nuisance should
specifically point out the things which the defendant is required to do and to refrain from doing
in order to abate the nuisance which is found to
exist. It should be as definite, clear, and precise
in its terms as possible, so that there may be no
reason or excuse for misunderstanding or disobeying it, and, when practicable, it should plainly
indicate to the defendant all the acts which he. is
restrained from doing, without calling upon hin1
for inferences or conclusions about which persons may well differ • • •.
"• • • In those instances in which injunction
lies to prevent conduct amounting to a nuisance
abatable by such remedy, it is limited to unlawful
acts, and is not available as a means of prevention
of lawful acts. Only so much of such conduct as
is unlawful can be restrained. The decree should
not enjoin more than that which constitutes the
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nuisance, and should never go beyond the requirements of the particular case. Where the injury
complained of results from acts that are not a
nuisance per se, but only such by reason of the
manner in which they are done or the surrounding
circumstances, the court will not grant an injunction in such form as absolutely to prohibit
the defendant's use of his property, if it is possible to frame a decree which in another form
will give the plaintiff the relief .to which he is
entitled.
"The operation of a legitimate business or
industrial plant which constitutes a private nuisance may be enjoined, where it clearly appears
that there is no other complete remedy for the
injury -done. But this should never be done if it
is possible to avoid it while still giving the plaintiff the relief to which he is entitled. In such
cases, the courts will go no further than is absolutely necessary to protect the rights of the complaining parties, and, if the business or plant
can be so conducted as not to constitute a nuisance, the injunction should be limited to prohibiting the acts complained of which constitute the
nuisance, leaving the defendant free to operate
it in a proper manner. It has been held that a
distinction may properly be drawn between cases
involving a nuisance caused by a factory or business which may be removed to another location,
and those involving one caused by the operation
of mines, quarries, and other enterprises for the
development of the natural resources of land,
which must be conducted at a fixed place, and that
an injunction should not be granted as readily
in the latter as in the former class of cases. But
this distinction is sound only in so far as it relates
to things- which are reasonably essential to the
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proper operation of the mine or quarry • • •."
(39 Am. Jur., Nuisances, Sees. 171, 172, pages 443444, 445).
"• • • We are committed to the rule in this
jurisdiction that where a lawful business is conducted in such manner as to constitute a private
nuisance, such nuisance may be enjoined and
abated, but the injunction ordinarily should be
limited not to the business itself, but to the usage
that creates the nuisance, leaving the right to
carry on the business in a proper and lawful manner and that it is only where such business cannot be conducted in any manner at the place
where situated without constituting a substantial
injury to adjoining property owners that the
injunction shall absolutely prohibit the operation
of such business * * *." (Fidelity Laboratories,
Inc. v. Oklahoma City, 190 Okla. 488, 125 Pac.
2d, 757-759).
"• • • While a race track is not a nuisance,
per se, the record is convincing that the track
and barns have been operated in such a manner
as to subject plaintiffs to a common or private
nuisance which should be abated. The rule applicable to the present situation was well stated in
Adams v. Kalamazoo Ice & Fuel Co., 245 Mich.
261, 222 NW 86, 87, as follows : 'While the court
of equity has power to abate nuisance in protection of property rights, and to conserve the
enjoyment, health, comfort, and welfare of individuals, it moves with caution, deciding each
case upon its particular facts, and accords protection against injury only in cases where an
action at law would afford no adequate redress.
If a nuisance is private and arises out of a particular manner. of operating a legitimate business,
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the court will do no more than point to the nuisance and decree adoption of methods calculated
to eliminate the injurious features * * *.'
"The trial court's decree, which permanently
enjoined defendants from further operation of the
race track, would destroy the business of defendant racing association, which business the legislature has seen fit to legitimatize by the adoption
of Act No. 199. Our de novo review of the record
convinces us that this decree did not equitably
determine the rights of the parties. The common
or private nuisance complained of by plaintiffs
arose, at least in part, from the apparently rather
negligent manner in which the racing association
operated its track and horse barns. We believe
that it could adopt methods which would largely
eliminate the nuisance complained of * *' *.

"* * * We conclude that the decree of the
trial court should be vacated and set aside and
that a decree should be entered in this court in
accordance with this opinion. The decree should
among other things, determine * * * (5) that the
method of operation of the race track and the
horse barns created a private nuisance which,
insofar as is reasonably possible, should be abated.
The decree should further provide that defendant
racing association shall enclose all manure receptacles; disinfect these receptacles and remove
all manure from the premises every 24 hours;
that it shall police and supervise the race track
premises and horse barns so as to eliminate, insofar as possible, all fire hazards, obnoxious noises,
disturbances, and improper conduct; and that it
shall from time to time do such other acts and
things as it can reasonably be required to do to
abate the private nuisance complained of. The
decree should further provide for remanding this
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case to the trial court for enforcement and for
such further action as may from time to time be
deemed necessary and advisable • • •." (Rohan
v. Detroit Racing Association, 314 Mich. ~6, 22
NW 2d, 433; 166 A.L.R. 1246, 1262, 1263).
"• • • And in any event, the restraint imposed by the decree should be no more extensive
t.han is reasonably required to protect the interests of the party in whose favor it was giyen
• • •." (32 C.J., Injunctions, Sec. 645, Page 378).

1. The prohibitory provisions of the judgment
do not specify with particularity the parts of the
operations of defendant and appellant which are
prohibited and restrained and as a consequence,
defendant and appellant cannot determine except
by trial and error method the specific methods of
operations which must be corrected in order to comply with the court's order.
It is clear that the court in its judgment was cognizant of the fact that it was beyond his power and authority to prohibit defendant and appellant from operating its plant. St-ated otherwise, the court did not intend
to shut down completely the operations of the plant. A
fair reading of the prohibitory features of the judgment
compels the conclusion that the court intended only to
prohibit and restrain those features of the operations
which created the nuisance. The problem therefore confronting the defendant and appellant since the entry of
this judgment has been to determine what aspect of the
operations must be changed and corrected in order for it
to eliminate the cause or causes of the nuisance. It is
submitted that under the authorities above cited it was
entitled to receive from the court a specific mandate as to
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what it must or must not do to eliminate the nuisance.
The question, therefore, is whether or not the injunctive
phases of the judgment are so broad and general in their
scope that defendant and appellant must either cease its
operations entirely or continue its operations at the peril
of being charged with contempt. In view of the fact
that court has exercised its injunctive power of regulating defendant's and appellant's operation, it is the contention of defendant that it was the duty of the court
to specify with particularity the nuisance causing agencies and direct either that the defendant and appellant
cease the operations of these agencies or in lieu thereof
correct the same so as to eliminate the cause of nuisance.
In considering this a~pect of the judgment defendant
and appellant directs the court's attention to the following precedents which are exceedingly pertinent. The case
of Williams v. Bluebird Laundry Company, 85 Cal. App.
388, 259 Pac. 484, involves a nuisance created by the operation of a steam laundry in the City of Los Angeles.
It was contended.

"* * * that because the judgment merely restrains the defendant from so conducting its plants
as to cause loud noises, offensive odors, black
smoke and soot, it is so indefinite as to render it
ineffective and that it must be reversed; that it is
impossible to determine what degree of noise or
degree of odors, etc. would constitute a violation
of the injunction; and that the defendant may
be subjected to citations for contempt at any time
that one of the plaintiffs may deem any noise,
odors, or smoke objectionable to hi1nself. * * *"
(259 Pac. 486).
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The court answered this contention:

"*' • • However, the judgmep.t plainly states
that the laundry or laundries shall be so operated
as to avoid causing loud noises, offensive odors,
black smoke, or soot or in any other such manner
as to be deleterious to the health of the plaintiff.
vVe think the entire judgment when read together
is sufficiently definite in this regard. • • • If the
operation of defendant's plant shall be deemed by
the plaintiffs to create such noises or pollution of
the atmosphere as to be deleterious to their health
or offensive to their senses, and should they produce competent and satisfactory evidence that any
or all of these objectionable features were injuring or destroying their health, we think they would
be entitled to relief under the terms of the judgment, otherwise, not. * * *" (259 Pac. 486-487).
Cited in the Bluebird case is Judson v. Los Angeles
Suburban Gas Company, 157 Cal. 168, 106 Pac. 581. The
judgment in that case enjoined the defendant from operating gas works in such a manner as to cause or permit
smoke, gas or offensive smells or fumes to be emitted
therefrom or to be precipitated upon the property of
plaintiff. The Supreme Court said:
"The appellants are enjoined from maintaining the same sort of nuisance that has caused the
annoyance to the plaintiff."
The third case which should be considered is Vowinckel v. N. Clark and Sons, 216 Cal. 156, 13 Pac. (2d)
733). In this case the court enjoined the defendant.

"*' * • from operating the four southerly kilns
and furnaces on the westerly side of its property
and from operating the remaining kilns and fur·
naces on the westerly side of its property and
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northerly of said four southerly furnaces, unless
and until it shall erect between the northerly
furnaces and the property of the plaintiffs a substantial fire proof wall or fence at least fifteen
feet in height." (13 Pac. (2d) 735).
The Supreme Court in passing upon this feature of the
injunction wrote as follows :

"* * * In the present case the court appears to
have given due consideration to the situation of the
defendant. This is apparent from the fact that
it refused to abate entirely the defendant's operations and granted the relief sought to the extent
necessary to preserve the rights of both parties.
In other words the court in the exercise of its
equity powers, has compared consequences and
has considered the injuries resulting to each party,
on the, one hand if the injunction be wholly denied,
and on the other if it be granted. The court, from
the evidence presented, gave heed to the rule that
in a proper case it will not enjoin the conduct of
the defendant's entire business, where such business is not a nuisance per se, if a less measure of
restriction will afford to the plaintiff the relief
to which he may be entitled. * * *
"The defendant contends that all of the infringements upon the plainttiff's rights can be eliminated by the erection of a fireproof soundabsorbing wall enclosing also the four kilns
ordered abated. An offer to construct such a wall,
with sliding doors. to permit loading, was made
upon the defendant's motion for a new trial; and
testimony of engineers and samples of materials
proposed to be used were produced on the hearing
of the motion. The trial court, however, declined
the offer and denied the motion for a new trial.
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This ruling is claimed to be prejudicial error and
we are urged to reverse or modify the judgment
on the ground that the proposed wall will give to
the plaintiff all the relief to which he is entitled.
But we are not persuaded that the court abused
its discretion in denying the motion. The court itself viewed the premises, and although it may
have been shown that the wall might tend to reduce the fire hazard and flares, nevertheless the
denial of the motion is persuasive that the court
remained unconvinced that either the vibrations or
noise would be disminished or eliminated. The
character of the property abated, and its location
with respect to the plaintiff's dwelling, together
with the finding that its operation causes great
vibration and noise disturbing to the plaintiff
and his household, is conclusive against the showing attempted to be made by the defendant. The
record shows that the trial court was justified in
abating a portion of the defendant's factory on the
ground that to control only the mannerof its conduct would be inadequate relief to the plaintiff
from the nuisance thereby maintained * * *." 13
Pac. (2d) 736-737).
The first two cited cases appear upon first reading
to. support the form of the injunction in the instant case.
However, a careful study of the factors involved in these
cases indicates that the situation confronting the defendant and appellant with respect ·to the present judgment
is entirely different from the situations involved in the
said two cases.
According to the court's findings in this case the constituent elements of the nuisance are (a) dust which is
precipiated upon the plaintiffs' properties; (b) noise
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created by the operations of the plant and repair of rollers, and (c) light flashes created by welding operations.
The evidence was sharply conflicting on each of these
issues, but resultant therefrom is proof of the methods
of operation of defendant's and appellant's plant which
require the use of many different kinds of machinery and
equipment (R. 70-880, Exhibits 15, 16, 17, 18, 19); of the
operations involved in the excavating of the raw materials and its transportation from the point of excavation
to the crushe:rs (R. 828, 850); of the actual processing
operations of crushing and grinding (R. 871, 877-879); of
the transportation of the completed material to the stock
piles (Ex. 6, 22) ; of the loading of the finished product
from the stock piles into trucks for transportation to
market (R. 905,. 906); and of the methods and means of
maintenance and repair of the plant (R. 882-894). The
processing operations therefore are complicated and
varied, but not all of the operations create a nuisance.
The evidence before the court was exhaustive and covered
the entire field of operations. The court had before it a
great number of photographs pres.entedby both plaintiffs
and defendant which reveal the complexity of the operation and the great variance among the different phases of
processing the raw materials to the end that the finished
product is available. The operations of the steam laundry
involved in the Bluebird case, supra, and the gas plant in
the Judson case, supra, are simple, and the bro.ad, g(merru
prohibitions in the injunctions· in these cases, would protect the respective plaintiffs and inform the defendants as
to causes and allow them to take direct corrective mea.s-
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ures. Not so in the pre sen~ case because of the variables involved in the processing operations. It was the
duty of the court in its findings and judgment to select
the specific causes and direct that the previous operations
giving ri~e to these causes should either cease or be corrected. Without specific and particular mandates directed at specific and particular causes, the judgment
becomes one of general prohibition against the operation
of defendant's plant and thereby nullifies the intention
of the court to reach only the nuisance causing agencies.
The prohibitory features of the judgment are so broad
effectually to shut down the operations of the plant unless
defendant and appellant takes upon itself the peril of
determining which of the causes contribute to the violation of the injunction. The law does not cast this burden
upon the defendant and appellant. The authorities cited
above clearly instruct .the court to specify the particular
operations which are enjoined to the end that the defendant's attention is directed to san1e so that it may eliminate
the causes of complaint.
Rule 65A (d), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, specifically prescribes that:
"Every order granting an injunction and
every restraining order shall be specific in terms ;
shall describe in reasonable detail and not by
reference to the complaint or other document,
the act or acts sought to be restrained * * ""."
(Emphasis supplied).
The judgment in this case violates this rule and creates
the confusion and uncertainty above delineated. Para103
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graph one of the judgment enjoins the defendant from
maintaining, using, or operating its gravel pit and processing plant
"so as to create a nuisance affecting plaintiffs,
their lands, homes, premises, and use thereof, arising from objectionable noise, dust, and flashing
lights as found by the Court and in the same manner and as more particularly set out and described
in the findings of fact on file herein." (Emphasis
supplied).

Here is a direct violation of the rule above cited. The
judgment in contravention of the rule refers to the findings of fact which is the "other document" denounced
by the rule. The rule is intended to prevent exactly what
has occurred in this case. As Barron and Holtzoff state
"It is insufficient to enjoin a defendant from
violations 'as charged in the complaint.' It is also
insufficient merely to incorporate long and verbose findings ; since the order should furnish the
defendant with a direct and succinct statement of
his alleged wrongful acts."
Reference is made to the form of the judgment in the
Vowinckel case, supra wherein the court specifically
enjoined the defendant
"from operating the four southern kilns and
furnaces on the westerly side of its property and
from operating the remaining kilns. and furnaces
on the westerly side of its property and northerly
of said four southerly furnaces unless and until
it shall erect between said northerly furnaces and
the property of the plaintiff a substantial fireproof wall or fence at least fifteen feet in height."
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Here is an example of a court giving due consideration to the specific cause of nuisance and interdicting
the same or causing corrective measures to be taken
by the defendant. The modus operandi of the injunction
in the Vowinckel case is applicable to the instant case and
shows what the court should have done in controlling the
nuisance causing factors in the gravel plant operations.
It is respectfully submitted that the present judgment is
erroneous in that it fails to follow the mandate of rule
65A (b).

2. It was the duty of the court to establish a
maximum tolerance for the contamination and pollution of the air by dust part=.cles and the absence of
such provision in the judgment exposes the defendant and appellant to charges of violating the injunction regardless of its good faith and honest purpose.
Defendant and appellant is entitled to receive from
the court a specific mandate that the atmosphere
shall .not contain at anytime more than a maximum
quantity of dust and fore~gn particles.
It was proved at the trial that the area in which defendant and appellant conducts its operations contains
a valuable deposit of sand and gravel (R. 830, 831, 952)
and that the material is considered the best and most
effective produced in the western section of the United
States (R. 950). tt was shown that the sand,
gravel and road aggregate yielded not only by the Walker
Deposit, but by the surrounding area, enters· into the
economy of Salt Lake City and is a highly necessary
material in the construction industry (R. 952). Further
the evidence shows that there are nine other gravel and
sand producing operations within a radius of six thou105
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sand feet from the Walker Deposit and defendant's
operations (R. 943-947). The evidence is conclusive that
these nine other operations cause dust and foreign particles to impregnate the atmosphere (R. 941-942, 954, Ex.
25). There is also evidence that in spite of the black topping of Wasatch Boulevard, the Big Cottonwood road
and the Butlerville Hill road, that passing vehicles cause
a great amount of dust to arise therefrom (R. 927, 934).
It is therefore apparent that even though the operations
of defendant's plant entirely ceased that the atmosphere
of the area in which plaintiffs' homes are located would
carry a certain amount of foreign particles arising from
these nine other gravel and sand operations and the public highways. It certainly will not be contended that defendant is responsible in any degree for the dust contributed to the atmosphere by these other operations. Attention is invited to the case of Hofstetter v. Geo. M.
Myer, Inc. supra, wherein it was stated "that the dust
produced by the plant is the same dust common to the
community and especially the road passing the plant and
the homes of plaintiffs, and that plaintiffs have some
dust, smoke and odors throughout the year from the dirt
and gravel road, adjacent railroad lines, and from the
city refuge dump.* • *" (228 P. (2d) 526).
The evidence in this case shows that there exists in
the area of the plaintiffs' properties an atmospheric
condition over which the defendant and appellant has
no control. This condition is produced by the other
sand and gravel operations in the vicinity and the public
highways. The evidence not only permits, but. also com-

106
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

pels the conclusion that even if defendant's and appellant's plant entirely ceased operations, that the atmosphere at the mouth of Big Cottonwood Canyon and in
the vicinity of plaintiffs' properties would be impregnated with dust arising from these other operations and
use of the public highways. This is not a situation where
defendant operates its plant in a district which is free
from atmospheric contamination caused by industrial
activities, but conversely, is a situation where defendant's operations are conducted in an area which already
possesses contaminated atmosphere arising from indus,

trial causes.
Under the authorities cited, supra, it was the duty
of the trial court in framing its judgment to have taken
into consideration the fact that the atmosphere surrounding and over plaintiffs' properties_ was not a dust free
atmosphere, but independent .of defendant's operations,
it normally carries a substantial burden of foreign particles. A finding that .defendant was_ guilty of creating
and maintaining a dust nuisance must of necessity be
premised on the hypothesis that defendants' operations
increased the normal dust laden content of. the atmosphere to a point· which _would be characterized a legal
nuisance. The defendant is not chargeable with the responsibility for the normal atmospheric conditions; and
therefore, the court should have determined:
(1) The normal dust fall in the vicinity independent
of defendant's operations; and
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(2) The amount of foreign particles which could
be added to the atmosphere by defendant's operation
without inflicting injury upon the plaintiffs and their
properties.
There was adequate evidence before the court to
have permitted and authorized it to make such findings.
Reference is made to the testimony of the expert, F. E.
Netzeband (R. :1!336, 1337, 1340, 1343-1347, 1354, 1359);
and to the testimony of the expert, Daniel J. Jones (R.
1461, 1474) for evidence upon which such findings and
provision of the judgment might have been founded.
In this connection, the court would have been authorized
to require the installation of certain methods of determining on a day to day basis the dust fall in the plant
area.
Defendant and appellant respectfully submits that
it is entitled to this guide rule in its operations to the
end that it will not be constantly exposed to litigation
and charges of violating the court's decree. The evidence
shows that there is a degree of tolerance between the
normal atmospheric contamination of plaintiffs' neighborhood and the maximum amount of atmospheric contamination which becomes a nuisance. The defendant
is entitled to the benefit of this tolerance in its operations
and the court in its judgment should have established
this maximum tolerance for the contamination of the air
by dust particles. It was entitled to receive from the
court a specific mandate designating the maximum quan-
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tity of dust and foreign particles in the atmosphere
which would be permitted before a charge of violating
the judgment could be successfully laid against it.
CONCLUSIONS
1. Under Article VIII, Section 9 of the Utah Constitution, the Supreme Court in this equity case has the
power and authority,

"• • • to go behind the findings and decree of
the trial court, consider all the evidence, decide
on which side the preponderance thereof is, ascertain whether or not the proof justifies the findings
and decree, and enter or direct such findings and
decree to be entered as the evidence, in the judgment of the appellate tribunal, may justify."
(Whittaker vs. Ferguson~ 16 Utah 240, 51 P. 980;
Tripp v. Bagley, 74 Utah 57, 276 P. 913; Baird v.
Upper Canal Irrigation Co., 70 Utah 527, 257 P.
1060; Dahl vs.·Cayias, 110 Utah 398, 174 P. (2d)
430).
Further, the court is authorized to remand this case
to the trial court with directions to modify the judgment
and findings so as to conform to the opinion of the appellate tribunal. (Salina Creek Irrigation Co. vs. Salina
Stock Company, 7 Utah 456; 27 P. 578. Affirmed 163
U. 8.109, 41 L. Ed. 90,16 S. Ct.1036).
2. In view of the authority vested in the Supreme
Court, defendant and appellant respectfully urges that
the judgment in this action should be set aside and the
case remanded to the trial court with directions: (1)
that findings of fact 9, Conclusions of Law 2, and Para-
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graph 2 of the Judgment (as the same pertains to the
Rudd right of way) be stricken in their entirety; (2)
That the findings and judgment (after the right of way
elements are eliminated) should be reformed so as (a)
to specify the par~~~~ar method, instrumentality, or
agency which causes the dust and noise to arise and to
confine the prohibitory features of the judgment to these
particularly defined· methods, instruments and agencies,
and (b) to determine the normal dust fall in the area
of pla~ntiffs' properties and to define the maximum tolerance of dust fall·which will be permitted without violation of
the provisions of
the judgment as reformed.
.
..
Respectfully submitted,

FRANKLIN RITER
FRED L. FINLINSON
Attorneys for Defendant and
. Appellant.
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